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 Union membership, as a percentage of the private sector workforce, has 
been in decline for fifty years.  I argue that the cause of this unrelenting decline 
is a single, fundamental factor–-the change in the United States economy from 
a corporatist-regulated economy to one based on free competition.  Most labor 
commentators have explained the decline by a confluence of unrelated economic 
and legal forces.  Labor economists typically stress economic explanations, 
which vary from compositional shifts in the job structure to increased competi-
tion both domestically and internationally.  On the other hand, labor law 
commentators naturally focus on labor law explanations, such as the difficulty 
of controlling management opposition to unions.  
This Article shows that both economic and legal forces must be viewed 
through the same lens.  What matters is the choice of the political economy.  
Once that system is chosen, the role and centrality of unions are determined.  
Unions are central to a corporatist regime and are peripheral in a liberal plu-
ralist regime.  Consequently, in my approach, to understand the causes of the 
decline in union membership it is critical to return to the period of the original 
growth in union power; that is, to the New Deal. 
In examining the differences in the political economy between today and the 
New Deal, one must look not only to labor law, but also to corporate law and 
antitrust.  Unions were successful in the 1930s when the goals of labor law 
were consistent with the goals of corporate law and antitrust.  These goals are 
in conflict today. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Union membership, as a percentage of the private sector work-
force, has been in decline for fifty-three years.  That is a long time.  
Today, private sector union membership is less than ten percent of 
private sector employment, far below its peak of thirty-four percent in 
the early 1950s, and roughly where it was in 1930.1
1 See infra fig.1, at 634.  In making this assertion I am comparing the solid line (un-
ion density, overall economy) with the dashed line (union density, private sector).  Be-
cause public sector unionism did not become significant until the early 1970s and gov-
ernment employment was relatively small in the 1930s, it is possible to treat the solid 
line as indicative of union density for the private sector as well as for the overall econ-
omy. 
 For purposes of this paper I will use the solid line for years prior to 1973 as an ap-
proximation of private sector union density and the dashed line for the years after 
1973 as actual private sector union density.  Note that in the initial overlap year of 
1973, the union densities for the private sector and the total economy are approxi-
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This unrelenting decline in union membership represents one of 
the most important institutional changes affecting the United States 
economy.  I argue that the cause of this unrelenting decline is a sin-
gle, fundamental factor–-the change in the United States economy 
from a corporatist-regulated economy to one based on free competi-
tion.  Most labor commentators have explained the decline by a con-
fluence of unrelated economic and legal forces.  Labor economists 
typically stress economic explanations, which vary from compositional 
shifts in the job structure to increased competition both domestically 
and internationally.  On the other hand, labor law commentators 
naturally focus on labor law explanations, such as the difficulty of con-
trolling management opposition to unions.  
This Article shows that both sets of factors must be viewed through 
the same lens.  What matters is the choice of the political economy.  
Once that system is chosen, the role and centrality of unions is deter-
mined.  Unions are central to a corporatist regime and are peripheral 
in a liberal pluralist regime.  Consequently, to understand the causes 
of the decline in union membership it is critical to return to the  
period of the original growth in union power; that is, to the New Deal.  
With private sector union density today back to its starting point in the 
early days of the New Deal, the union movement has made a complete 
360-degree journey. 
In examining the differences in the political economy between 
today and the New Deal, one must look not only to labor law, but also 
to corporate law and antitrust.  The success of unions depends heavily 
on their place in the overall legal and economic structure of the coun-
try.  Unions were most successful in the 1930s when the goals of labor 
law were consistent with the goals of corporate law and antitrust.  
These goals are in conflict today. 
The historical story of the growth and decline of unions plays out 
in two Acts.  The First Act is of nearly exponential growth, with the 
Second Act being an extended period of decline.  The theme of the 
First Act is the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration’s adoption of a 
corporatist economic policy, which was the key innovation of the Na-
tional Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA).  Corporatism views free com-
petition as a destructive force that has to be both controlled and 
channeled through institutions that practice fair–-but not free–-
competition under the watchful, mediating power of the government.  
mately the same.  The two measures only diverge sharply during the 1970s due to the 
growth of union membership and employment in the government sectors. 
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In corporatism, fair competition means the “stabilization of business” 
with prices at levels that support fair union wages, and economic pol-
icy that responds to institutional actors such as unions and corpora-
tions rather than to individuals. 
As a coherent public position, the high-water marks for corporatist 
policies were the adoption of the NIRA in June 1933 and the meas-
ures taken to guide the economy during World War II and the Korean 
War.  Consequently, while the NIRA was declared unconstitutional in 
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,2 important elements of 
corporatist policies continued to operate well beyond the New Deal. 
During Act I of the story, the union movement quickly came to a 
position of substantial strength and prominence.  A primary goal of 
unions—-to take wages out of competition—-was a near-perfect policy 
fit with corporatist ideology.  Labor unions thus played a central and 
positive role, in part as a counterweight to the power of corporations, 
and in part as a separate institutional force in the adoption of eco-
nomic policy.  In the structure of this period, unions were not a niche 
movement, representing those unique sectors most easily unionized, 
but a mass movement. 
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), often viewed as the 
causal factor in the expansion of unions, actually represents a step 
backward in my approach.  Yes, the NLRA expanded unions’ organiz-
ing abilities and strengthened their ability to achieve collective bar-
gaining contracts.  And, yes, union membership continued to increase 
sharply when the NLRA replaced the labor policy of the NIRA.  But, 
the NIRA was an integrated plan that had compatible policies govern-
ing labor law, antitrust policy, and corporate law.  When the NIRA was 
replaced by the NLRA, all that survived was the pro-union labor law.  
The critical support of the corporate and antitrust policies was lost.  
However, in certain sectors, industry-specific regulatory mechanisms 
were adopted that in effect continued the policies of the NIRA. 
The Second Act began with the end of the Korean War.  Although 
union membership, as a percentage of employment, peaked after 
World War II, it remained at or near the peak through the end of the 
Korean War.  In that sense, the First and Second Acts were separated 
by an eight-year intermission, where the groundwork was laid for the 
decline in unions that was about to begin. 
2 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
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The Second Act, unlike the First, was not marked by singular 
events such as the passage of the NIRA or the outbreaks of World War 
II and the Korean War.  Rather, the Second Act developed slowly as 
the legacies of the corporatist past were gradually replaced with an 
economic policy that had but one primary theme—-that the country is 
best served by a competitive economy.  In a competitive economy, 
nothing of importance is taken out of competition, certainly not labor 
costs.  Consequently, as the nation’s policies became pro-competitive, 
taking wages out of competition became difficult to accomplish. 
I.  ECONOMIC FACTORS IN THE DECLINE IN UNION MEMBERSHIP 
Union strategy creates an overarching goal of negotiating for 
higher wages and benefits than those that would prevail in a competi-
tive economy.3  At this goal, unions have been and continue to be suc-
cessful.  The same is not true for the union goal of growing, or at least 
maintaining, union employment.  Union density is now less than ten 
percent of the private sector workforce.4  Obviously, the two goals are 
likely to be in conflict:  it is not surprising that employment suffers 
when pay premiums exist. 
In explaining the extended decline in union employment, the un-
ion pay premium is a logical culprit.  However, there is also a substan-
tial literature citing other factors, including compositional shifts in 
employment, management opposition to unions, the growth of a body 
of federal rules that may serve as a substitute for unions, and the in-
creased openness of the American economy to international trade. 
In the conventional story, it is the coming together of these dispa-
rate, largely independent factors that contributes to the decline in un-
ion membership.  In my story, these factors are endogenous, them-
selves caused by the one, overarching factor:  the change from a 
corporatist to a competitive economy. 
The compositional shift in employment away from traditionally 
unionized industries is most frequently cited as a cause of union de-
cline.5  This explanation itself includes a variety of shifts; for example, 
3 See generally BARRY T. HIRSCH & JOHN T. ADDISON, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
UNIONS:  NEW APPROACHES AND EVIDENCE 9 (1986) (“[A] union can cause wage and 
nonwage outcomes to diverge from competitive levels, primarily although not exclu-
sively through the use of the strike threat and other restrictions on factor supplies.”). 
4 See infra fig.1, at 634. 
5 Based on the accounting methodology of Farber and Western, American jobs 
are disproportionately being created in the service-producing sectors rather than in 
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a decline in the product market of more traditionally unionized in-
dustries, a decline in the percentage of the labor force composed of 
males with a stable labor market attachment, and a decline in the per-
centage of full-time workers. 
In the broader multidecade picture, compositional elements are 
problematic as an exogenous explanatory factor.  It is certainly easier 
to increase membership in areas where unions are already strong.  But 
in a vibrant economy, compositional shifts are a regular phenomenon.  
Strong organizations adapt themselves to these shifts, and unions have 
indeed been able to organize new sectors when the underlying policy 
support was available. 
In a fascinating paper published in 1933, George Barnett, the in-
coming president of the American Economic Association, predicted 
that “unionism is likely to be a declining influence in determining 
[the] conditions of labor.”6  He attributed this decline to structural 
shifts in the economy, a logical inference since unions had always or-
ganized the skilled craft trades and transportation workers.7  The new 
industrial unions proved that unionization did not have to be limited 
to craft workers.8  The scene was played out again when unions organ-
ized the state and local sectors during the 1960s and 1970s.9
the goods-producing sectors, and in professional and managerial occupations rather 
than in blue-collar occupations.  In addition, the American labor force is increasingly 
better educated and more mobile, whereas unions have traditionally been strongest 
among less-educated and less-mobile workers.  See Henry S. Farber & Bruce Western, 
Accounting for the Decline of Unions in the Private Sector, 1973-1998, in THE FUTURE OF PRI-
VATE SECTOR UNIONISM IN THE UNITED STATES 28, 29 ( James T. Bennett & Bruce E. 
Kaufman eds., 2002) (arguing that “most of the decline in the [private sector] union 
membership rate is due to differential employment growth rates in the union and 
nonunion sectors,” rather than “changes in union organizing activity”). 
6 George E. Barnett, American Trade Unionism and Social Insurance, 23 AM. ECON. 
REV. 1, 6 (1933) (quoted in Bruce E. Kaufman, The Future of U.S. Private Sector Unionism:  
Did George Barnett Get It Right After All?, in THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE SECTOR UNIONISM IN 
THE UNITED STATES, supra note 5, at 330, 330).  At the time of his presidential speech, 
Barnett was writing about a sharp decline in the absolute number of union members 
from a peak membership of 4.55 million in 1920 to 3.21 million in 1924 and continu-
ing at a low level when the Depression set in. Richard B. Freeman, Spurts in Union 
Growth:  Defining Moments and Social Processes, 58 tbl.A1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Re-
search, Working Paper No. 6012, 1997). 
7 See Kaufman, supra note 6, at 332-33 (reviewing Barnett’s theory that the narrow-
ing of the areas within which American trade unions operated in the 1920s, combined 
with the replacement of labor by machinery, led to the decline in union membership 
after 1920). 
8 After the passage of the NIRA, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) 
adopted the slogan of “Organize the Unorganized in the Mass Production Industries” 
and proceeded to organize automobile, steel, lumber, and rubber workers who were 
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The same is true of other compositional shifts.  For example, the 
shift to a more mobile population is itself partially a result of today’s 
competitive economy with considerable job turnover as new firms de-
velop and old ones lose market share.  In a corporatist regime of fair 
competition there would be less job turnover, because declining in-
dustries would not be as exposed to withering attacks from new en-
trants. 
Management opposition to unions has been a longstanding com-
plaint by union supporters who believe that it represents an important 
causal factor in the decline in unions.10  However, in a competitive 
economy, where corporations are managed on behalf of the share-
holders, above-market union pay should be expected to generate 
management opposition.  Similarly, the claim that management oppo-
sition is higher today than in the past is predicted by the fact that the 
union pay premium remains high while product markets are more 
competitive.11
outside of the craft union system.  FOSTER RHEA DULLES, LABOR IN AMERICA:  A HIS-
TORY 268 (2d rev. ed. 1960). 
9 See Melvin W. Reder, The Rise and Fall of Unions:  The Public Sector and the Private, 
2 J. ECON. PERSP. 89, 103-05 (1988) (describing an “upsurge in public sector unionism 
during the 1960s and 1970s” as a result of “pent-up demand for collective bargaining,” 
“a climate of opinion in which virtually any group had de facto standing to make de-
mands upon constituted authority,” and favorable changes in labor law). 
10 See generally PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE:  THE FUTURE OF LA-
BOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 10-11 (1990) (presenting evidence for both supply-side 
and demand-side explanations for the decline in union membership); Morris M. 
Kleiner, Intensity of Management Resistance:  Understanding the Decline of Unionization in the 
Private Sector, in THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE SECTOR UNIONISM IN THE UNITED STATES, su-
pra note 5, at 292, 292 (describing management opposition to unions as “carrots”—
incentives offered to employees such as pay raises and employee involvement pro-
grams—and “sticks”—forceful deterrents such as captive-audience speeches by supervi-
sors, harassment and firing of union leaders, and failure to engage in bona fide bar-
gaining for first contracts).  The issue becomes more complex to the extent that 
management opposition includes an increased use of unfair labor practices.  From a 
purely economic perspective, one can attribute the growth in unfair labor practice 
claims against management to a similarly rational cost-benefit calculation on the part 
of management.  Still, the issue is highly controversial, largely because of the norma-
tive questions it poses. 
11 For evidence that the rise in the union wage premium during the 1950s was a 
causal factor in the subsequent decline in union membership, see Peter D. Linneman, 
Michael L. Wachter & William H. Carter, Evaluating the Evidence on Union Employment 
and Wages, 44 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 34, 51 (1990) (“[A]lthough unions may have 
been hurt by exogenous forces causing sectoral output shifts from goods- to service-
producing industries, they have been hurt even more by their rising wage premiums.”); 
see also Bernt Bratsberg & James F. Ragan, Jr., Changes in the Union Wage Premium by In-
dustry, 56 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 65, 81 (2002) (“[U]nion wages held up better to in-
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Another factor frequently mentioned regarding the decline in un-
ion membership is the growth of government employment policies, 
including those dealing with health and safety, pensions, and antidis-
crimination.12  These policies serve as substitutes for unions since em-
ployees can have the benefit of the policies without the cost of union 
membership.  However, the adoption of such policies by the federal 
government may be a result of low union membership, rather than its 
cause.  If most sectors are unionized, a policy option is to leave labor 
market regulation to private contracting.  When few private sector 
workers are covered by collective bargaining contracts, private con-
tracting cannot be relied upon. 
This paper does not argue that compositional shifts, management 
opposition, and labor market regulation are not important.  They are 
important, but they are not underlying causes of the decline in un-
ions.  Rather, the role of these factors works through the changing in-
stitutional structure of the economy.  It is the change in the institu-
tional structure that is truly causal. 
II.  CORPORATISM:  STRUCTURE AND THE GREAT DEBATES 
A.  Economic Structure of Corporatism 
At the time of the 1932 presidential election, unions had declin-
ing membership, possessed little economic power, and were largely a 
niche movement in the skilled craft trades.  Yet within a few years, un-
ions grew into one of the power actors in the New Deal.  These were 
heady days, as union leaders put aside concerns about mere survival 
and became central actors on the economic stage of an emerging po-
litical order.  This transformation set off an extraordinary flourishing 
of union membership.  The reason for the turn of events was the 
adoption of corporatist policies by Franklin D. Roosevelt’s administra-
tion.  In the corporatist economy that Roosevelt wanted to construct, 
strong unions were pivotal actors.  Since the reality was that unions 
creased international competition than nonunion wages, though apparently at the ex-
pense of reduced union employment.”). 
12 See generally James T. Bennett & Jason E. Taylor, Labor Unions:  Victims of Their 
Own Political Success?, in THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE SECTOR UNIONISM IN THE UNITED 
STATES, supra note 5, at 245, 247 (arguing that the phenomenon described by the 
“substitution hypothesis”—-a theory that government regulations have replaced the 
need for unions—-is “an important contributing factor” in the decline of union mem-
bership). 
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were weak and unimportant on the national scene, things had to 
change quickly, and so they did. 
What is corporatism?  Although the term is not well known in the 
United States, corporatist policies had been debated in European po-
litical circles since the late 1800s and became formally adopted by a 
number of countries in the 1920s and 1930s.13  The term never be-
came an articulated political theory or policy in the United States, 
even when the Roosevelt administration was adopting important 
planks of the theory’s structure.  But corporatism it was. 
As described by one commentator, corporatism is one of the three 
great “isms” of the twentieth century, with communism and liberal 
pluralism representing the other two.14  Although pure forms of any 
of the three movements do not exist in the real world, the theoretical 
pure forms serve as useful reference points.  In terms of jurispru-
dence, the three can be differentiated in terms of core questions:  who 
is enfranchised and thus gets to address the sovereign, and whose 
preferences count when the sovereign makes its policy decisions? 
In liberal pluralism, only the preferences of individuals in their 
role as citizens get counted in the welfare calculus of government pol-
icy.  Policy outcomes are determined by competition for the votes of 
individuals in a political marketplace.  While individuals with shared 
interests form advocacy groups to compete for favorable policy out-
comes, the interest groups themselves have no political status beyond 
the aggregation of their members’ interests.  Although corporations, 
unions, and interest groups express their official views, they count 
only to the extent that they offer informed judgments, make political 
donations, or control votes.15
Corporatism, on the other hand, has a more complex structure 
and unions figure prominently into its workings.  The pivotal distinc-
tion between corporatism and pluralism is that in corporatism, groups 
are enfranchised as well as individuals.  Individuals who belong to 
13 See HOWARD J. WIARDA, CORPORATISM AND COMPARATIVE POLITICS:  THE OTHER 
GREAT “ISM” 36-42 (1997) (discussing the underpinnings of corporatist thought in 
Europe as well as the factors contributing to its rise in acceptance both inside and out-
side Europe). 
14 See id. at 5 (“Liberal-pluralism, Marxism, and corporatism have for a long time 
offered competing perspectives on society, governance, and state-society relations.”). 
15 At the other extreme, in communism, only the party gets to address the state 
and only its preferences matter.  Unions are instruments to carry out the party’s politi-
cal agenda.  Advocacy groups keep a low profile, if they exist at all.  The people’s de-
mocracies are democracies only in the sense that the party claims knowledge of what 
the people should want. 
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groups in a sense get to have two or more votes, and their group par-
ticipation may be the most important.  As one commentator has de-
scribed it, those outside the shield of a recognized negotiating group 
have only “the devalued currency of electoral representation.”16  Indi-
viduals are identified by their group, whether it be parish, occupa-
tional association, industry association, or union organization.  The 
groups then operate as the political actors.  Rather than employing a 
“one-person, one-vote” system, it is the groups that vote in determin-
ing government policy, with the more powerful groups having the 
most votes.17
Corporatism emphasizes a cooperative relationship among 
groups, and between the state and different groups.  This is based on 
two principles.  The first is the conception of some sort of objectively 
cognizable “public interest” that is articulated by the government with 
consultation from the major groups.  Once the public interest is ex-
pressed, the various groups are expected to adapt their policies so as 
to support the public interest.18
Corporatism also seeks to limit the number of groups with access 
to the state.  Where pluralism envisions an unlimited number of in-
terest groups acting essentially as so many atomistic actors creating a 
competitive political marketplace, corporatist theory sees a limited 
number of groups, each wielding substantial political power.19  Groups 
are assembled into hierarchies, with “peak associations” at the top 
holding the most influence with government policymakers.  These 
peak associations are groups like industry-wide business associations or 
national labor federations, and the broad membership of these 
groups is thought to discourage narrow conceptions of political inter-
est.  Consequently, in corporatism, it is not the local unions but the 
16 ALAN CAWSON, CORPORATISM AND POLITICAL THEORY 145 (1986). 
17 See WIARDA, supra note 13, at 18 (“In this way, group interests and solidarity 
would become stronger than the individual ones as represented in liberalism; similarly, 
the class-conflict model of Marxism would be replaced by the presumedly class har-
mony model of corporatism.”). 
18 HARMON ZEIGLER, PLURALISM, CORPORATISM, AND CONFUCIANISM:  POLITICAL 
ASSOCIATION AND CONFLICT REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, EUROPE, AND TAI-
WAN 21-22 (1988) (“Corporatism thus details a decision-making system in which con-
flict is subordinate to cooperation, a set of circumstances possible only if the state regu-
lates the ebb and flow of group behavior.”). 
19 See CAWSON, supra note 16, at 35 (explaining that in liberal pluralism, public 
and private entities do not intersect, while a key notion to corporatist theory is the in-
terplay between the state and private groups, which wield power due to the state’s need 
for their cooperation). 
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national unions, and even more so, the federations, that are expected 
to wield power. 
These peak groups are expected to exert discipline among their 
constituent local groups so as to maintain cohesive support for na-
tional policies.  Corporatism requires group discipline to function 
properly.  The peak associations can then battle with, or serve as coun-
terweights to, rival peak associations.  For example, union federations 
are pivotal because they offer a counterweight to the largest corpora-
tions, which are perhaps the most powerful of the peak associations. 
B.  Great Debates Favoring Corporatism 
1.  Labor Market-–Labor Law 
In a corporatist economy, the role of unions is fundamentally dif-
ferent than in a competitive economy.  To corporatist commentators, 
unions were necessary to prevent wages from falling to arbitrarily low 
levels.  Malthus’s view of the reproductive abilities of workers was still 
a strong force:  population growth would always lead to subsistence 
level wages.20  Labor relations experts offered similar arguments.  For 
example, John R. Commons, one of the original giants of industrial 
relations, argued that “cutthroat competition” among workers set the 
market wage at the wage that the “cheapest laborer” would be willing 
to accept.21  In Commons’s view, unions or minimum wage legislation 
could help break the excessive competition without causing job losses 
because employers would respond to the higher wage by insisting on 
offsetting gains in productivity.22
These institutional theories took a holistic approach to labor mar-
kets that was appealing on one level but highly confused on another.  
20 See T.R. MALTHUS, 1 AN ESSAY ON POPULATION 17-18 ( J .M. Dent & Sons Ltd. 
1958) (1798) (discussing how an increase in laborers without an increase in wages will 
naturally result in an increase in the price of goods, which means a real decrease in 
laborers’ wages). 
21 JOHN R. COMMONS & JOHN B. ANDREWS, PRINCIPLES OF LABOR LEGISLATION 48 
(4th rev. ed. 1936). 
22 Id. at 73 (denying that a guaranteed minimum wage would decrease “incentive 
and output” and claiming that it would in fact have “the opposite effect,” both because 
employers would expect greater returns and because workers would respond to “the 
improved rate of remuneration”).  Commons’s and Andrews’s support for this claim 
was meager, citing to R.H. Tawney’s study of the tailoring industry, which concluded 
that “as a general rule the girls work better if they are paid more.”  R.H. TAWNEY, THE 
ESTABLISHMENT OF MINIMUM RATES IN THE TAILORING INDUSTRY UNDER THE TRADE 
BOARDS ACT OF 1909, at 133 (1915) (quotation marks omitted). 
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Commons lacked an equilibrating framework that allowed wages to 
rise with the productivity of the workforce or, if nothing else, to avoid 
a free fall to subsistence level.23  Rather, he had a story, and the story 
was a complex mixture of business cycle dynamics and unconstrained 
managerial power.24
This labor market debate has always had a strong social as well as 
an economic component, and this was particularly true after World 
War I and the communist revolution in Russia.  President Wilson, at-
tending the Versailles conference, spoke about “the question of labor” 
being of primary importance.25  Public intellectuals called on workers 
to unite to defend not only their own economic interests, but also to 
fight class inequities.  Noted progressive Frederick Howe remarked 
that “[l]abor would not serve privilege.”26  The labor movement of-
fered assistance in ending the “immorality of exploitation” brought 
about by corporate power dealing with unorganized labor.27  Clyde 
Summers, at a later time and in the context of the NLRA, made a 
forceful claim that labor unions promoted democracy, and that in a 
democratic political system, workers should be allowed free associa-
tion and the choice of their own representatives.28
23 Commons’s bleak outlook borrowed from Malthus, but without the key feature 
of the Malthusian model, which was the perfectly elastic supply of workers at the subsis-
tence wage, driven by the inability of the citizenry to control its fertility.  Commons did 
mention immigration as being a negative force on the wages of the unskilled, but did 
not include the uncontrolled immigration needed to maintain wages at the subsistence 
level in a modern labor market model. 
24 Kaufman does a wonderful job of “modernizing” Commons and pointing out 
that his writings have been unfortunately neglected.  See Bruce E. Kaufman, The Or-
ganization of Economic Activity:  Insights from the Institutional Theory of John R. Commons, 52 
J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 71, 93 (2003) (“Although Commons was a major figure in 
American economics in the first-third of the 20th century, his theoretical work is now 
largely neglected and/or dismissed by most contemporary writers . . . .”).  Commons 
was an expert on the institutional forces at work in labor markets.  But his theory of 
wages was internally inconsistent (except on the most generous of reading) and was 
contradicted by the data. 
25 Steve Fraser, The ‘Labor Question’, in THE RISE AND FALL OF THE NEW DEAL OR-
DER, 1930-1980, at 55, 55 (Steve Fraser & Gary Gerstle eds., 1989) (quoting Woodrow 
Wilson). 
26 Id. (quoting Frederick Howe). 
27 Id. at 56. 
28 See Clyde W. Summers, The Public Interest in Union Democracy, 53 NW. U. L. REV. 
610, 622-23 (1958) (arguing that unions in particular must be democratic because they 
play an important role in society:  “A pluralist society such as ours gives special signifi-
cance to certain private groups and structures which serve as centers of distributed 
power for regulatory purposes”).  If people become accustomed to deferring to experts 
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The modern concept of competitive labor markets was undevel-
oped at this time.  It was only in 1932 that John Hicks published his 
then-controversial The Theory of Wages.  Hicks’s contribution was to de-
velop what he called the marginal productivity theory of wages, or 
what modern readers would recognize as contemporary wage theory.29  
But Hicks’s construct of competitive labor markets had not yet es-
caped the boundaries of the academy when the NIRA was being 
drafted.30
2.  Antitrust-–Business Regulation 
Proponents of antitrust laws have been an extraordinarily mixed 
group, and this was true in the 1930s as well.  One group was the 
economists and other commentators who favored antitrust policy as a 
way to make the economy more competitive.  They were joined by 
business associations that favored the antitrust laws to the extent that 
they encouraged the free enterprise system.  A second major group, 
the progressives, supported antitrust policies to achieve entirely dif-
ferent goals.  To the progressives, antitrust law should promote com-
petition in the form of a large number of small, locally owned firms.  
If one large firm were more efficient than the smaller ones, then the 
progressives would favor protecting the latter. 
The progressives were concerned over the growth of large firms 
because of its political implications:  it represented an accumulation 
of political power in a few powerful hands.  At the time of the New 
Deal, the Great Satan to the progressives was The Great Atlantic and 
Pacific Tea Company (A&P).  A&P was efficient and had low prices, 
and it was precisely that efficiency that threatened to destroy numer-
ous family owned and small businesses.31
or autocrats in the governance of their day-to-day work life, then they will start ceding 
their democratic rights in their political life as well. 
29 J.R. HICKS, THE THEORY OF WAGES 86 (2d ed. 1963) (defining the term “mar-
ginal product” and discussing its role as a “regulator of wages”). 
30 Hicks was 28 years old when he published The Theory of Wages.  Since he was not 
well established until his influential Value and Capital, published in 1939, his ideas 
spread slowly. 
31 See Richard C. Schragger, The Anti-Chain Store Movement, Localist Ideology, and the 
Remnants of the Progressive Constitution, 1920-1940, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1011, 1025 (2005) 
(quoting then-Senator Hugo Black of Alabama, from 1930:  “The local man and mer-
chant is passing and his community loses his contribution to local affairs . . . . A few of 
these useful citizens . . . become clerks of the great chain machines . . . while many en-
ter the growing ranks of the unemployed.”). 
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Historically, the Sherman Act is seen as the best case for the “effi-
ciency” rationale for the antitrust laws, although even that law is sub-
ject to mixed interpretations.32  The legislation that followed at the 
turn of the century, namely the Federal Trade Commission Act and 
the Clayton Act, began to be problematic in that certain business poli-
cies that allowed efficient large firms to win the competitive struggles 
became unlawful.33  Even so, while the legislation’s impact is mixed, 
there is little explicit anticompetitive, small-producer language in the 
Acts.34
It was not until the New Deal that protection for small, less effi-
cient businesses became an articulated goal of antitrust policy.  Al-
though the Robinson-Patman Act would not become effective until 
1936,35 leading progressives were actively pushing for Robinson-
Patman-type legislation in the late 1920s and early 1930s.36  It is now 
received wisdom that the Act was a product of the pessimistic view that 
unregulated competition meant destructive competition that harmed 
small businesses, and, more specifically, the strongly held belief that 
the success of the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company in taking 
market share from the small local stores had to be constrained.37
Even the Supreme Court was prepared to support fair competition 
over free competition in certain circumstances.  In its Appalachian 
Coals decision the Court applied a “rule of reason” analysis and held 
coal producers’ concerted activity to be a reasonable restraint of com-
petition, even though all competition among producers had been 
eliminated.38  The rationale for this unusual decision was that the 
32 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY:  THE LAW OF COMPETI-
TION AND ITS PRACTICE 49-51 (2d ed. 1999). 
33 See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX:  A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 
35 (1978) (characterizing the Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts as having 
“had thoroughly pernicious results”). 
34 See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, POLICY, AND 
PROCEDURE:  CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 16 (5th ed. 2003) (“Although there are a 
few statements suggesting that the protection of the opportunity of small business to 
compete was one motivating factor for the legislators, these statements do not imply 
that protection of small businesses was meant to override other goals.”). 
35 Robinson-Patman Antidiscrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 74-692, 49 Stat. 1526 
(1936) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (2000)). 
36 See Schragger, supra note 31, at 1057-62 (discussing the congressional response 
to chain stores, which included pushes “to amend the antitrust laws to protect the 
small dealer”). 
37 See FREDERICK M. ROSE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN 
ACT 534 (1962). 
38 Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 372-78 (1933). 
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Court was responsive to arguments about the “unfortunate state of the 
industry” and the overly competitive conditions that resulted from it.39
3.  Corporation Law 
To the corporatists, the Great Depression appeared to confirm 
the darkest fears of its leading political and economic supporters.  
One such supporter was Adolf Berle.  A key architect of the NIRA, 
Berle was also a major commentator on American corporations.  
Berle, working with Gardiner Means, believed that capitalism would 
generate a highly undesirable concentration of power in the hands of 
a few corporations.  In their influential book The Modern Corporation, 
Berle and Means concluded with the following gloomy view of the 
corporate landscape: 
 The rise of the modern corporation has brought a concentration of 
economic power which can compete on equal terms with the modern 
state . . . . The future may see . . . the corporation, not only on an equal 
plane with the state, but possibly even superseding it as the dominant 
form of social organization.  The law of corporations, accordingly, might 
well be considered as a potential constitutional law for the new eco-
nomic state, while business practice is increasingly assuming the aspect 
of economic statesmanship.40
To Berle and Means, the possibility that large corporations could 
exercise enormous political power was based on two predictions.  The 
first was that no existing economic forces could prevent individual 
corporations from amassing enormous market power.41  The second 
was that senior managers in large corporations, who owned little of 
the company’s stock, would be reckless in spending corporate funds.42
The corporate law predictions in The Modern Corporation reflected 
the authors’ observation that the modern corporation, unlike earlier 
business organizations, was marked by a nearly complete separation of 
39 See Rudolph J. Peritz, A Counter-History of Antitrust Law, 1990 DUKE L. J. 263, 289 
(noting the Court’s responsiveness to “‘the industry . . . in distress’” and the “‘evil con-
ditions to be cured’” (quoting Appalachian Coals, 288 U.S. at 372)). 
40 ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 357 (William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1982) (1933). 
41 See id. at 41-46 (predicting the continued growth of corporations with no eco-
nomic forces to check them). 
42 See id. at 119-25 (discussing the divergent motives of managers, whose interests 
might be served through decisions harmful to shareholders). 
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ownership and control.43  To the authors, this meant that the senior 
managers who controlled these corporations might well act to amass 
political power, even if such power had no economic rationale.  Since 
it was the shareholders’ money that would be spent, corporations were 
not constrained in building political empires if the managers were so 
inclined.  Specifically, “[u]nchecked by present legal balances, a so-
cial-economic absolutism of corporate administrators, even if benevo-
lent, might be unsafe.”44
Other corporate law scholars also took the position that managers 
had a social responsibility to the community and, in modern parlance, 
to other stakeholders.45  Merrick Dodd, in his famous debate with 
Berle, argued that the separation of ownership and control implied 
that shareholders had given managers the authority to take the ac-
tions that they deemed to be appropriate to fulfill their social obliga-
tions.46  In effect, the corporations were quasi-public entities and the 
managers had as much right to be called owners as did the sharehold-
ers.47
43 See id. at 90-118 (describing the phenomenon in which shareholders own a cor-
poration but leave control to management). 
44 A.A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees:  A Note, 45 HARV. L. 
REV. 1365, 1372 (1932). 
45 The question of whether corporate boards of directors can successfully be so-
cially responsible has generated ongoing debate.  For examples, see Victor Brudney, 
The Independent Director–-Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597 (1982), 
and Elliott J. Weiss, Social Regulation of Business Activity:  Reforming the Corporate Govern-
ance System to Resolve an Institutional Impasse, 28 UCLA L. REV. 343 (1981).  Both authors 
support the proposition that corporate boards should be socially responsible.  They 
disagree on the success of independent directors in achieving this goal.  Weiss argues 
that a board dominated by independent directors can be socially responsible, but only 
if the state requires that the nominees be restricted to a pre-selected group of candi-
dates committed to social objectives.  Id. at 426-34.  Brudney argues that independent 
directors are less effective than regulation in directing corporate action.  Brudney, su-
pra at 658.  More recently, Jeffrey Gordon has argued that independent directors are 
more likely to maximize stockholder welfare than to be socially responsible.  Jeffrey N. 
Gordon, Independent Directors and Stock Market Prices:  The New Corporate Gov-
ernance Paradigm (Aug. 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=928100. 
46 For an excellent treatment of the Dodd and Berle debate, see William W. Brat-
ton, Berle and Means Reconsidered at the Century’s Turn, 26 J. CORP. L. 737, 761-62 (2001).  
The debate between Dodd and Berle is well known in the corporate law literature.  
Based on Berle’s response to Dodd, Berle is frequently viewed to be a supporter of 
shareholder rights.  But this interpretation is incorrect.  The Modern Corporation’s public 
policy stance is in accord with corporatism and not shareholder supremacy.  This point 
is recognized in Dalia Tsuk, From Pluralism to Individualism:  Berle and Means and 20th-
Century American Legal Thought, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 179, 185-94 (2005). 
47 “If, therefore, the managers of modern businesses were also [their] owners, the 
development of a public opinion to the effect that business has responsibilities to its 
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Berle’s response to Dodd has to be read in the context of his cen-
tral role in the Roosevelt administration and in the adoption of the 
NIRA.48  He wrote that the “[r]igid enforcement of property rights” of 
passive shareholders would give way in the face of a “convincing sys-
tem of community obligations.”49  In meeting their obligations, corpo-
rate leaders would be expected to “set forth a program comprising fair 
wages, security to employees, reasonable service to their public, and 
stabilization of business.”50  Once developed, narrow shareholder in-
terest in maximizing the value of the corporations would need to give 
way.  In other words, the fiduciary duties of managers would address 
not only the interest of shareholders, but also of society.  Ultimately, 
Berle favored a federal fiduciary law principle that would mean that 
managers would be required to pursue the well-laid national goals, 
but were otherwise responsible to the shareholders.51
Berle’s solution did not make its way into policy, perhaps because 
the NIRA did not last long.  Consequently, we can only speculate as to 
how this might have been accomplished.  The possibilities for imple-
mentation range from a federal fiduciary duty law to  mandates by the 
National Recovery Administration (NRA).  But the potential rules or 
recommendation could have led to a major restructuring of fiduciary 
employees and its customers would, quite apart from any legal compulsion, tend to 
affect the conduct of the better type of business man.”  E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom 
Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1153 (1932). 
48 Roberta Romano also interprets Berle as a corporatist.  She writes that “Berle 
reconceptualized the manager’s role to be that of a disinterested public servant, a role 
that could provide the social stability necessary for the attainment of the corporatist 
ideal.”  Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923, 
936 (1984). 
49 BERLE & MEANS, supra note 40, at 356. 
50 Id.  Berle did believe that shareholders remained the true owners (or at least 
residual claimants) of the corporation and that they had made no such quasi-
contractual giveaway of their rights as residual claimants.  While Berle had few good 
words for absolutist corporate administrators, he had a soft spot for shareholders, 
whom he identified with ordinary working people who needed to collect their divi-
dend checks to make ends meet.  See, e.g., Berle, supra note 44, at 1368 (arguing that a 
disruption in the income stream of stock and security holders would cause a “large 
portion” of them to “devolve[] on the community,” and to require relief). 
51 See id. at 1372 (looking to a time when “corporate administration will be held to 
a high degree of required responsibility . . . conceived not merely in terms of stock-
holders’ rights, but in terms of economic government satisfying the respective needs of 
investors, workers, customers, and the aggregated community”). 
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duty law to support an economy based on fair rather than free compe-
tition.52
In summary, all the pieces were in place for the United States to 
adopt a corporatist policy.  Policymakers dealing with labor market, 
antitrust, and corporate law policies were in agreement that competi-
tive forces had become destructive and that this was a cause of the 
Great Depression.  In this context, unions were a critically important 
part of a well-functioning economy. 
III.  THE NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL RECOVERY ACT 
A.  The NIRA Experiment 
The passage of the National Industrial Recovery Act represented 
the adoption of corporatism by the United States and was recognized 
at the time as drawing from the models being created in Europe.53  
The first full adoption of a corporatist policy was in Benito Mussolini’s 
Italy in 1922, and a few other European countries followed suit during 
the 1920s.54  But it was the Great Depression that brought about the 
wholesale adoption of corporatist policies in Europe and then in the 
United States.55
52 Berle never got around to making specific the context in which shareholder su-
premacy would give way to the broader government policy.  See William W. Bratton & 
Joseph A. McCahery, The Equilibrium Content of Corporate Federalism, 41 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 619, 637 n.90 (2006) (noting that Berle proposed “an overarching standard” to 
guide the courts in the exercise of their equitable powers). 
53 In addition to the NIRA, the Miller-Tydings Act of 1937, ch. 690, 50 Stat. 673 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000)), the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936, Pub. 
L. No. 74-692, 49 Stat. 1526 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 13a-13b, 21a 
(2000)), the Davis-Bacon Act of 1931, ch. 411, § 1, 46 Stat. 1494 (codified as amended 
at 40 U.S.C. § 276a-276a5 (2000)), as well as state and local price-maintenance laws, 
were elements of the move toward a corporatist economy. 
54 European countries adopting corporatist policies prior to the Great Depression 
included Portugal, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Poland, Albania, and Yugoslavia.  WIARDA, su-
pra note 13, at 40-41.  The corporatist regimes were first known as fascist regimes, until 
the word fascism became associated with Nazi Germany and lost its appeal.  Id. at 111.  
However, Romano differentiates between corporatism and fascism. Romano, supra 
note 48, at 935-36. 
55 The United States had experimented with corporatism in order to mobilize the 
country to fight the Great War.  President Wilson established the War Industries Board 
in order both “to ensure the adequate supply of raw materials and manufactured 
goods” and “to maintain labor peace during the war by incorporating both capital and 
labor under government guidance.”  WIARDA, supra note 13, at 135.  The Board estab-
lished an “essentially corporatist, tripartite (business, labor, the state) arrangement to 
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The NIRA, passed in June 1933, was the centerpiece of President 
Roosevelt’s first-term New Deal.56  The NIRA was administered by the 
National Recovery Administration (NRA).  The NRA’s leaders were 
committed corporatists who sought to replace what was seen as an in-
dividualistic, selfish, hyper-competitive system with a system built 
around concerted activity under government supervision.  The first 
head of the NRA, General Hugh Johnson, believed that capitalism 
had brought the United States to the brink of collapse.57
The NIRA was supported by an unstable alliance:  the corporatists 
and the progressives.58  Both shared a common belief that the free en-
terprise system had failed.  After that, they offered diametrically op-
posed solutions.  Corporatists favored an administered economy.  In-
dustries would be pushed to form cartels built around private 
ownership of firms.  In this new, centralized economy, corporate 
managers and union leaders would help establish the policies that 
would then direct their own activities.  The progressives, on the other 
hand, wanted to protect small business and were deeply troubled by 
the idea of allowing the managers of the large corporations a signifi-
cant policy role. 59
At the core of the NIRA were its codes of fair competition for in-
dividual industries.  Trade associations, as the hierarchical peak 
groups, could ask the federal government to approve codes of prac-
tices for their industries.60  The codes, once approved by the NRA, 
were legally binding on all the firms in the industry.  If the trade asso-
ciation proved reluctant, the NRA could adopt a code for an industry 
that failed to adopt one.61
protect against strikes during the war and to ensure the necessary massive and uninter-
rupted production.” Id. 
56 National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933), invalidated by 
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
57 See DONALD R. BRAND, CORPORATISM AND THE RULE OF LAW:  A STUDY OF THE 
NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION 99-100 (1988) (describing Johnson’s disdain for 
the competitiveness of capitalism and his admiration for corporatism). 
58 See id. at 128-29 (describing the “inherent tensions between these alternative 
conceptions of corporatism”). 
59 See id. at 129 (noting that progressives had “no faith in the ability of business-
men to clean their own house”). 
60 Ch. 90, § 3a, 48 Stat. 195, 196 (“Upon the application to the President by one or 
more trade or industrial associations or groups, the President may approve a code or 
codes of fair competition for the trade or industry . . . .”). 
61 BRAND, supra note 57, at 235 (noting that although the NRA had the power to 
impose a code on an industry unilaterally, it was rare for the principal parties to fail to 
come to a “mutually acceptable agreement”). 
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The codes offered business firms an unusual plum—namely, le-
galized concert of action as a way out of the disastrous price cutting 
that had led to alarming numbers of bankruptcies.  In short order, 
most of the major industries were covered by codes, and the compa-
nies that belonged to associations with approved codes were allowed 
to display the Blue Eagle, which publicly advertised their good stand-
ing with the NRA.62
The NIRA got off to a fast start, but it fell apart almost as quickly.  
The internal contradictions and the unnatural alliances that sup-
ported the NIRA were too great.  In the rush to implement the New 
Deal, the original drafting of the NIRA was left to progressive politi-
cians such as Senator Robert Wagner, a second-term Democrat from 
New York, and allowed little input from businesses or unions.63
Once approved, business firms were supposed to change their be-
havior and become reliable members of the cartel.  However, no 
sooner had the fair price been set than cartel members started cheat-
ing on the price to gain additional customers and profitable volume.64  
Noncompliance begat further noncompliance, as code-abiding busi-
nessmen began to feel the pinch of competition from cheating firms.  
The NRA responded by establishing a Compliance Division and a Na-
tional Compliance Board with regional offices in every state.65  But the 
enforcement problem could not be controlled by a voluntary system. 
The lack of cooperation might have earned the enmity of the ad-
ministration, but if a company did not fear political repercussions, its 
loss would be minimal.  Although the Blue Eagle symbol was popular, 
it was inadequate to secure cooperation.66  Corporatism, while volun-
tary in spirit, worked best in countries where the cost of annoying the 
political regime carried greater penalties.67
While the firms were busy cheating on the cartel prices, the pro-
gressives’ support for the NIRA was declining because of unhappiness 
over the announced price increases permitted by the codes.  While the 
progressives supported the wage increases being won by newly organ-
62 Id. at 94 (explaining that the popularity of the Blue Eagle program was such 
that opposition was “tantamount to disloyalty”). 
63 See id. at 83-86 (describing the drafting of the NIRA). 
64 See id. at 103 (referring to a “crisis in compliance” by the fall of 1933). 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 94 (commenting that the “moral enthusiasm” for the NRA lasted only for 
the first few months of the program). 
67 See generally WIARDA, supra note 13, at 71-93 (analyzing corporatist regimes at the 
regional and national levels). 
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ized workers, they were upset by the price increases that were neces-
sary to cover the cost of the wage increases.68  Aggrieved by these in-
ternal contradictions of the system, progressives in Congress began to 
argue that the codes’ price-fixing practices were illegal under prevail-
ing antitrust law.69
B.  The Labor Movement During the NIRA Experiment 
The unions were major beneficiaries of the NIRA.  At the start of 
the New Deal, labor was largely unorganized, weak, and entirely un-
able to serve as a functional partner in the business/labor cooperative 
envisioned by the NIRA.  The spur for the creation of the modern la-
bor union movement was section 7(a) of the NIRA.70  While section 
7(a) was only a restatement of the previously acknowledged right of 
labor to organize, it added to that right a prohibition on interference 
by employers.71  In addition, the industry codes, before being ap-
proved, “had to meet specific conditions regarding the rights of em-
ployees to participate in union activities and requirements of employ-
68 For an excellent discussion of the conflict within the progressive movement as it 
tried to come to terms with Roosevelt’s corporatist economy, including the govern-
ment’s adherence to fair prices and acceptance of price-fixing under the sponsorship 
of government agencies, see Schragger, supra note 31, at 1043 (examining the tension 
between antimonopoly progressives and corporatist New Dealers). 
69 Key to the price codes was a rule that permitted manufacturers to exchange in-
formation about not only past, but also current and future selling prices.  Graham K. 
Wilson, Why Is There No Corporatism in the United States?, in PATTERNS OF CORPORATIST 
POLICY-MAKING 219, 231 (Gerhard Lehmbruch & Philippe C. Schmitter eds., 1982).  
Without the NIRA’s blessing, this practice would have been illegal under prevailing 
antitrust statutes; progressive legislators saw the rule as a threat to the nation’s antitrust 
laws. 
70 Section 7(a) stated: 
[E]mployees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively through 
representatives of their own choosing, and shall be free from the interference, 
restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation 
of such representatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities 
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protec-
tion . . . .
National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, § 7(a)(1), 48 Stat. 195, 198, invalidated by 
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
71 The exact scope of the right to be free from interference was never clarified, 
but it did provide the basis for limiting the employer’s right to hire and fire based on 
an employee’s interest in unionization.  It also left ambiguous the legal status of such 
previously forbidden practices as secondary boycotts, interference with contractual re-
lations, and refusal to work on nonunion goods.  E.g., BRAND, supra note 57, at 230 
(discussing the legal advantages the NIRA provided to the labor movement). 
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ers to comply with maximum work hours and minimum rates of 
pay.”72
The union leadership saw the bigger picture:  labor was a neces-
sary component of Roosevelt’s new cooperative relationships.  Unions 
campaigned for worker support on the platform that “[t]he President 
wants you to unionize.”73  “In August 1932 there were 307 federal and 
local unions affiliated with the AFL.  In July and August 1933, imme-
diately after the passage of the NIRA, 340 new charters to federal and 
local unions were issued.  In the following year 1196 more charters 
were issued.”74
While unions supported the NIRA and prospered under it, they 
found elements of the new cooperative/public interest environment 
less to their liking.  The American union movement had always been 
built around business unions that would collectively bargain with indi-
vidual employers to establish the terms and conditions of employ-
ment.  The codes of fair competition, on the other hand, provided for 
industry-wide maximum hours and minimum wages arrived at 
through an openly political process.  In addition, union leadership 
was reluctant to undermine its goal of improving the economic posi-
tion of union members in favor of what the NIRA decided was the 
public interest.75
To succeed in the new system, unions and business had to exercise 
self-restraint in their bargaining demands and to be responsible in 
72 THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND THE NEW DEAL:  LEGISLATIVE ACTS IN THEIR EN-
TIRETY (1932-1933) AND STATISTICAL ECONOMIC DATA (1926-1946) 194 (Frederick E. 
Hosen ed., 1992). 
73 BRAND, supra note 57, at 271 (quoting from a union banner of the period). 
74 Id. at 272.  William Green, president of the AFL, credited section 7(a) with add-
ing 1.5 million new union members, more than a one-third increase, by the time of the 
October 1933 convention.  MARC ALLEN EISNER, REGULATORY POLITICS IN TRANSITION 
84 (2nd ed. 2000). 
75 The major union grievance with the NIRA was that it allowed for diverse union 
interests to be represented in the same bargaining unit, a kind of proportional repre-
sentation.  This was in direct conflict with the primary goal of exclusive representation 
favored by the AFL locals.  The concept of a menagerie of unions of different stripes 
working under the umbrella of a powerful peak association under the control of na-
tional union leadership was not, and never had been, part of American unionism.  In-
stead, stress was placed on strong locals as the exclusive bargaining agent of the work-
ers, negotiating with specific employers about the terms and conditions of individual 
workplaces.  See David A. McCabe, The Effects of the Recovery Act Upon Labor Organization, 
49 Q. J. ECON. 52, 64-78 (1934) (predicting that the likelihood that the labor move-
ment would be able to take advantage of the new labor rights granted by the NIRA 
would largely be dependent on its ability to coalesce within a bargaining system “which 
is industry-deep as well as industry-wide”). 
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supporting national priorities over their own priorities.  This did not 
happen.76  There were numerous union-organizing and bargaining 
conflicts with businesses that required the mediating skills of the 
NIRA leadership and often Roosevelt himself.77  Rather than paving 
the way for successful bargaining between the many new unions and 
the newly organized companies, strikes and lockouts spread.  Instead 
of providing for greater labor stability, the number of workdays lost to 
strikes nearly tripled between 1932 and 1934.78
This provided one of the continuing dilemmas faced by the sup-
porters of the NIRA.  The NIRA leadership wanted a system where 
“fundamentally decent businessmen would not be forced by competi-
tive pressures to exploit their employees.”79  While their goal was to 
adopt regulations that would encourage cooperative industrial prac-
tices, the effect of the labor policy was to stir inherent conflicts be-
tween labor and management.  The result was the unleashing of com-
bative forces that the NIRA regulators could not control.80
The new social ethic propagated by the system had just not caught 
on.  Although the new economic system was premised on cooperation 
by the key players, the drafters forgot to train the “fundamentally de-
cent businessmen” and labor leaders in the new etiquette that was the 
centerpiece of the system.81  The organizational hierarchies envi-
76 See BRAND, supra note 57, at 94 (noting that the Depression did not elicit the 
“level of virtuous self-restraint” necessary for NRA compliance). 
77 See DULLES, supra note 8, at 271-72 (describing the precipitous increase in 
strikes under NIRA as workers fought for higher wages and union recognition). 
78 See BRAND, supra note 57, at 257 (chronicling the growth of labor militancy after 
the NIRA’s passage). 
79 Id. at 12. 
80 See id. at 277 (noting that New Dealers attempted to “unleash the forces of re-
form,” while at the same time maintaining control over “excessive labor militance”). 
81 Gross, Schragger, and Brand take different positions on the NIRA and its crea-
tion.  See generally 1 JAMES A. GROSS, THE MAKING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS 
BOARD:  A STUDY IN ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND THE LAW 9 (1974) (“The politics of the 
New Deal . . . were flexibly pragmatic rather than ideologically rigid.  The administra-
tion’s goal was to create a friendly, cooperative partnership out of many diverse inter-
ests with the federal government acting as broker state, unifying, harmonizing, and 
mediating among the major interest groups.”); Schragger, supra note 31, at 1042-43 
(observing that “[t]he anti-chain store movement emerged at the very moment the 
country was forced to rethink the premises of an old political-economic order” and 
that the movement “gained sustenance from the crisis that precipitated that rethink-
ing”); BRAND, supra note 57, at 81-90 (reviewing President Roosevelt’s ideologically 
charged inaugural speech and his subsequent actions in recruiting a “Brain Trust” of 
advisors to facilitate the adoption of progressive ideas by political activists).  Gross 
stresses the pragmatism of Roosevelt in creating the NIRA where Schragger and Brand 
see it as a strong political statement by the progressives and the coalition that helped 
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sioned by the corporatist system did not materialize.  Neither the 
Chamber of Commerce nor the AFL could successfully force member 
firms or union locals to modify their own goals in accord with the 
public policy goals announced by the Roosevelt administration.  Nor is 
it clear that they ever tried to rally their troops.82
Simply put, neither management nor labor was willing to play 
within the new corporatist structure.  Corporations were unconvinced 
that the relaxation of the antitrust laws was sufficient to compensate 
them for the cost of section 7(a).  Union leaders were in a similar po-
sition, as members’ aspirations and militancy increased along with 
workers’ new organizational rights.  And unions, more than business, 
were willing to gamble that the NLB (or later the NLRB) or the Presi-
dent himself would intervene and support their claims in order to re-
store labor peace.  As a consequence, the NIRA was terminal even be-
fore it was put to rest by the Supreme Court in Schechter.83
The source of my interest in the NIRA is that it provided a struc-
ture in which unions could prosper by being integral players in the 
formulation of the nation’s economic policy.  In this system, unions 
were indeed “part of the solution.”  The union leadership was correct, 
with some literary license, in claiming that Roosevelt wanted—-or 
more specifically, needed—-the workers to unionize. 
The NIRA was the catalyst behind the surge in union membership 
that occurred in the 1930s.  Union membership increased 33% in just 
the two years, from 1933 to 1935, that the NIRA was in operation.84  
But the new unions formed during these two years and the impetus 
behind organized labor in general were just beginning to show results.  
get Roosevelt elected.  I take more of the Schragger/Brand position since I also stress 
Roosevelt’s bold, if failed, move to adopt a corporatist economic structure for the 
United States.  The adoption of corporatism hardly seems pragmatic. 
82 Henry Harriman, president of the Chamber of Commerce, claimed in May of 
1933 that the NIRA was “The Magna Charta of Industry and Labor” and his legal staff 
would immediately begin drafting a model code of fair competition.  CHARLES F. 
ROOS, NRA ECONOMIC PLANNING 43 (Frank Freidel ed., Da Capo Press 1971) (1937).  
However, by November of 1933 the Chamber had become concerned with the level of 
government involvement in industry regulation, and by May 1935 had “publicly de-
clared war on the New Deal.”  BRAND, supra note 57, at 140, 284. 
83 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).  In 
Schechter, the Court held that the code-making authority conferred by NIRA was an ex-
cessive delegation of legislative power and therefore unconstitutional.  Id. at 542.  The 
Schechter Court’s use of the nondelegation doctrine to overturn NIRA is now viewed as 
a “legal anachronism” because equally broad grants of authority to government agen-
cies have been consistently upheld since the New Deal.  BRAND, supra note 57, at 291. 
84 See infra fig.1, at 634. 
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Between 1935 and 1940, union membership increased by nearly 
150%.  During the seven-year period between NIRA’s passage and 
1940, organized labor membership grew from 2.6 million to 8.42 mil-
lion.  Union density—-the percentage of employees who were union 
members—-jumped from 11% of the economy to 26%. 
IV.  THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT,  
INDUSTRY REGULATION, AND WORLD WAR II 
A.  National Labor Relations Act 
In the history of American unionism, the NIRA is given short 
shrift by commentators, who prefer to focus on the NLRA.  In fact, the 
NLRA was intended to continue and strengthen the NIRA’s labor 
policies.  Senator Wagner’s ideas for the NLRA were fashioned out of 
his experiences with the failure of the NIRA.85  He was one of the pri-
mary authors of both.  The Roosevelt administration backed the 
NLRA only after the NIRA had been declared unconstitutional, and 
then only with some hesitation.86
On the surface, the NLRA was modeled after the NIRA.  The 
heart of the NLRA, section 7, was largely a carryover from section 7 of 
the NIRA.87  Workers were given a right to join labor organizations, to 
bargain collectively, and to engage in concerted activities, such as 
strikes, without interference, restraint, or coercion by management.88
However, the NLRA was different from the NIRA in three key re-
spects.  One major difference was that it replaced voluntarism with 
mandates and a new enforcement mechanism.  Section 8(1) outlawed 
employer coercion of employees in the exercise of their section 7 
85 In Senate debates on the Wagner Act, Senator Wagner stated:  “‘Every one of its 
provisions is addressed to specific evils that have become abundantly manifest during 
the ten months’ experience of the National Labor Board [during the NIRA].’”  Mark 
Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act:  Power, Symbol, and Workplace Coopera-
tion, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1379, 1401 (1993) (quoting 78 CONG. REC. 12,018 (1934)). 
86 See GROSS, supra note 81, at 141, 143-44 (describing President Roosevelt’s pro-
gression from offering no support for the NLRA to endorsing the NLRA in “‘some 
form’” after it became clear that the bill would pass “‘overwhelmingly whether he en-
dorsed it or not’” in the shadow of the impending Schechter decision). 
87 Id. at 3.  The change from the NIRA to the NLRA and the early days of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board are described in great detail in GROSS, id., which remains 
the premier discussion of these issues. 
88 Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 157-
158(a)(1) (2006)). 
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rights.89  Employers could not foster company-controlled unions or 
work councils, and unions had a right to exclusive representation of 
employees.90  Unfair labor practices by employers were now controlled 
by providing the National Labor Relations Board with real enforce-
ment powers.91
The second key difference was that the NIRA, although a volun-
tary system, was much broader in scope in its attempt to change the 
industrial system.  The theory behind the NIRA cooperative system 
was logically coherent, containing not only a labor policy, but also an-
titrust and corporate law policies consistent with the labor policy.92  
When the NIRA was declared unconstitutional in Schechter, the only 
piece of its complex industrial policy that was reformulated in new 
legislation was the labor policy.  The industry codes were gone, anti-
trust reverted to a pro-competitive policy, and any thoughts of chang-
ing the fiduciary duties of directors had been abandoned. 
Finally, the passing of the baton from the NIRA to the NLRA sig-
nificantly reduced the public policy role of unions.  Unions had no 
seat at the government’s policy table because peak associations, in-
cluding labor, were no longer invited.  Unions were still favored by 
public policy because they were instrumental in reducing industrial 
strife.  But in their collective bargaining with employers, unions were 
now acting in their own interest rather than in the public interest 
when they bargained for above-competitive wages and benefits. 
On balance, these key differences would eventually prove to be 
harmful to organized labor.  While unions had won in the short term 
with stronger enforcement mechanisms against employers and greater 
statutory proscription of employer activity, they lost in the larger pic-
ture because their key supports–-ancillary industrial policies and the 
government’s need to foster its peak associations–-were gone. 
Labor commentators talk about the cooperative business/labor 
environment that was to result from the creation of the NLRA, at least 
as its legislators intended.  One can make a strong case that some in-
dividuals involved in the drafting of the NLRA, particularly Senator 
89 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2006). 
90 Id. § 158(a)(1)-(a)(3). 
91 See, e.g., id. § 160(a)-(b) (empowering the Board to prevent unfair labor prac-
tices affecting commerce and to hear grievances); id. § 160(e)-( j ) (empowering the 
Board to seek injunctions of enforcement of its orders from the courts); id. § 161 (out-
lining the Board’s investigative powers). 
92 See GROSS, supra note 81, at 9 (describing the NIRA as a pragmatic “omnibus 
proposal” representing a true concert of self-regulation, antitrust, and labor interests). 
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Wagner, entertained such hopes.93  But the idea that the transition 
from the NIRA to the NLRA would make management more coopera-
tive in dealing with unions was illusory. 
Absent the elaborate nonlabor market policies of the NIRA, it is 
difficult to imagine why supporters of the NLRA would believe that 
business leaders would voluntarily cooperate and agree to pay a “fair” 
wage rather than a “competitive” wage.94  The higher costs could no 
longer be passed on in higher prices.  Corporate boards of directors 
could not credibly claim that they were favoring labor in order to 
meet their commitments under government policies.  Even the sym-
bolism of the Blue Eagle was gone. 
Moreover, the NLRA introduced the terminology of the “competi-
tive wage” in its preamble.95  The language does not refer to “taking 
wages out of competition,” but rather to maintaining the competitive 
wage during business cycles.  Wages could fall below competitive levels 
during a depression, and that outcome had to be avoided.  But, there 
was no policy language in the Act that favored “fair” wages above 
competitive levels.  This was not a matter of semantics.  Wagner, as 
well as all the other participants in drafting the NLRA, should have 
been well aware of the differences between the competitive wage and 
the fair wage after their experiences with the NIRA. 
B.  Industry-Specific Regulation 
The adoption of the NLRA and the abandonment of a formal 
corporatist structure did not coincide with a new era of free competi-
tion.  In its place was a host of industry-specific regulatory mecha-
nisms.  Indeed, from an administrative law perspective, the New Deal 
is best remembered for the creation or expansion in the powers of 
these regulatory agencies.  Most of these agencies enacted rules that 
controlled entry and exit and fixed prices.  In so doing, the new regu-
latory agencies were akin to miniature or industry-specific NIRAs 
93 See Barenberg, supra note 85, at 1427-30 (detailing Wagner’s vision of collective 
bargaining as cooperative rather than adversarial). 
94 For the most credible claims that the NLRA can be interpreted as intending to 
develop a cooperative collective bargaining environment, see id.  See also JAMES B. AT-
LESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 40-41 (1983) (noting that 
the Act was intended to “reduce industrial strife” by promoting peaceful resolution to 
disputes, barring “those employer actions thought most disruptive,” and compelling 
employers to bargain in good faith with employee representatives). 
95 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000). 
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aimed at preventing excessive competition.  A few examples should be 
sufficient to illustrate this point. 
When the codes of fair competition for the motor vehicle industry 
died with the NIRA, the American Trucking Association pushed for 
the successful passage of the Motor Carrier Act in 1935.  This pro-
vided for government-sponsored cartelization in that all trucking 
companies had to submit proposals for any rate changes for inspec-
tion by the public, including competitors.96  If the Interstate Com-
merce Commission (ICC)97 determined that the rates were below its 
estimate of the full cost of the transaction, the new rates were de-
nied.98  This prevented price competition which threatened profits 
and, with the unionization of the industry, also prevented the under-
cutting of prices that might weaken the ability of firms to pay the un-
ionized rates. 
To regulate the emerging airline industry, the Civil Aeronautics 
Act of 1938 created the Civil Aeronautics Authority, renamed the Civil 
Aeronautics Board (CAB) in 1940.99  The CAB was closely modeled 
after the ICC, and like the ICC, had the authority to regulate entry 
and exit in the market and to set “just and reasonable” prices.100  The 
CAB represented the New Deal’s commitment to limiting competition 
as a means of creating economic stability.  As the first annual report of 
the CAB stated, “[f]or the first time air carriers and the public [were] 
safeguarded against uneconomic, destructive competition.”101
In 1935 and 1938, respectively, the Federal Power Act and the 
Natural Gas Act significantly expanded the powers of the Federal 
Power Commission (FPC).102  Under these statutes, the FPC had the 
96 See Thomas Gale Moore, Unfinished Business in Motor Carrier Deregulation, REGU-
LATION, Summer 1991, at 49-50, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/ 
regv14n3/reg14n3-moore.html (describing the history of motor carrier regulation and 
how it prompted reforms and a later movement toward deregulation). 
97 The Interstate Commerce Commission was created in 1887 to regulate the rail-
roads.  See Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, §§ 11-12, 24 Stat. 379, 383.  It was 
abolished in 1995 and its remaining powers transferred to the Department of Trans-
portation.   Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 
104-88, 109 Stat. 803. 
98 Moore, supra note 96 at 49, 50. 
99 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601 § 201, 52 Stat. 973, 980-81, authority reor-
ganized and renamed by Reorganization Plan No. IV, § 7, 54 Stat. 1234, 1235 (1940). 
100 EISNER, supra note 74, at 116-17. 
101 Id. at 117 (quoting CIV. AERONAUTICS AUTHORITY, ANN. REP. 2 (1939)). 
102 Natural Gas Act, ch. 556, 52 Stat. 821 (1938); Federal Power Act of 1935, ch. 
687 pt. 2, 49 Stat. 847.  The Federal Power Commission was established in 1920 to 
  
2007] LABOR UNIONS 609 
 
authority to “control the profits, prices, and services” of companies 
that produced or transported natural gas for interstate commerce or 
sold electricity across state lines.103  In order to meet its goal of secur-
ing “just and reasonable prices,” the FPC required companies to sell 
their services for close to their average cost of production.104
A labor market example of the regulatory spirit of the 1930s was 
the Davis-Bacon Act.105  The goal of Davis-Bacon was to assure prevail-
ing wages in federal construction projects.  What “prevailing wages” 
came to mean under Department of Labor regulation was union 
wages; that is, “fair” rather than competitive or market wages.106  Davis-
Bacon is appropriately seen as an industry regulation policy because it 
set the price of labor and, indirectly, the market price.  In essence, 
Davis-Bacon did for the construction industry what ICC and FPC rate-
setting did for the transportation and power industries, respectively. 
The theories behind the regulation of individual industries were 
the natural progeny of the NIRA.  The key elements are all there.  
There is regulation on entry by new firms or exit of existing firms.  To 
assure a firm’s profitability, prices were set administratively based on 
the concept of full-cost pricing.  Full-cost pricing included a profit for 
a firm based on its required market rate of return on capital.  Regu-
lated firms often had direct input into the regulatory process.  Finally, 
unionized firms could pay above-competitive, fair wages under the 
oversee federal hydroelectric projects.  Federal Water Power Act, ch. 285, 41 Stat. 1063 
(1920).
103 STEPHEN G. BREYER & PAUL W. MACAVOY, ENERGY REGULATION BY THE FEDERAL 
POWER COMMISSION 1 (1974).
104 Id. (quoting § 205(a), 49 Stat. at 851). 
105 Ch. 411, 46 Stat. 1494 (1931) (codified as amended at 40 U.S.C. §§ 276a to 
276a -5 (2000)). 
106 Davis-Bacon was enacted during the Hoover administration and required that 
the prevailing wage in a locality be paid on federally funded public construction pro-
jects.  The Act was a response to the precipitous drop in construction wages during the 
Depression as contractors competed to have the lowest bid by importing labor from 
more distressed areas.  See ARMAND J. THIEBLOT, JR., PREVAILING WAGE LEGISLATION 
28-29 (1986) (noting that common construction wages fell from pre-Depression levels 
of $3.50 to $4.00 per day to less than $2.00 per day by 1931).  As enacted in 1931, 
Davis-Bacon was extremely vague regarding the definition of a prevailing wage and 
contained no provision for the government to determine the prevailing wage before 
contractors made their bids.  In fact, Hoover vetoed an amendment which would have 
added such a provision on the grounds that it would require too many government 
resources.  Id. at 31-32.  It was not until 1935 that Roosevelt signed into law the current 
system, under which the Department of Labor (DOL) predetermines the prevailing 
wage in each locality.  The definition of “prevailing wage” was left to the discretion of 
the DOL.  Id. at 33-34. 
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protective umbrella of full-cost pricing and regulated entry.  These 
regulated sectors became the most strongly unionized and had the 
highest union wage premiums.107
C.  Union Gains:  Corporatism During World War II 
Full-blown corporatist policies returned with World War II in re-
sponse to the need for increases in production of war machinery.  
Given the exigencies of the war, Roosevelt replaced the soft sanctions 
of the NIRA with heavy-handed, authoritarian sanctions.  The irony of 
corporatism is that the voluntarism that it preaches works best when 
“voluntarism” is backed by the threat of government sanctions. 
The Roosevelt administration intervened in private sector labor-
management relations with unprecedented frequency and to an un-
precedented extent to prevent private labor-management disputes 
from affecting war production.108  The United States Conciliation Ser-
vice helped management and labor settle disputes and strikes, while 
the National Labor Relations Board handled union representation 
and unfair labor practice complaints.109  The number of cases the 
United States Conciliation Service and the National Labor Relations 
Board handled nearly tripled, from 11,000 in the 1940 fiscal year to 
30,000 in the 1945 fiscal year.110  In 1941, Roosevelt supplemented 
these organizations by creating the National Defense Mediation 
Board, which settled 96 of its 118 cases, despite having little power be-
yond “fact-finding” and arbitrating cases when both parties agreed to 
do so.111  Following the collapse of the National Defense Mediation 
Board, Roosevelt created the National War Labor Board, which lasted 
until the end of the war in 1945.112
Several major strikes in 1941 helped set the tone of government 
support and prompted the militancy of unions to gain a permanent 
107 By 1973, the private sector union density across the mining, construction, du-
rable goods manufacturing, transportation, and utilities industries was forty-one per-
cent, as compared to the national average union density of twenty-four percent.  BU-
REAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY (1973). 
108 See BARTHOLOMEW H. SPARROW, FROM THE OUTSIDE IN:  WORLD WAR II AND 
THE AMERICAN STATE 96 (1996) (discussing federal labor regulation during the war). 
109 Id. at 68-69. 
110 Id. at 85. 
111 Id. at 70. 
112 Id. at 70-71.  It is noteworthy that the National War Labor Board handled an 
additional 20,000 cases between 1942 and 1945, beyond those heard by the National 
Labor Relations Board.  Id. at 85. 
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hold on their members.  There was considerable concern that the end 
of the war could result in a return to depression conditions, and un-
ions felt they needed to entrench their position as the exclusive bar-
gaining representative of the workers.  Workers at the Federal Ship-
building and Drydock Company’s Kearny, New Jersey yards went on 
strike after management rejected a National Defense Mediation Board 
recommendation to adopt a “maintenance of membership” plan.113  
Bethlehem Steel workers struck over the company’s continued sup-
port of an internal employee representation plan, which the National 
Labor Relations board found to be company-dominated, and against 
an order to dissolve the organization.114  Milwaukee’s Allis-Chalmers 
Manufacturing Company plant struck for months when the United 
Automobile Workers’ request for a closed shop was not met.115  In De-
troit, American Federation of Labor transportation workers struck, 
closing the city’s bus and trolley network, seeking exclusive bargaining 
rights.116
When dispute resolution failed, the government had a new policy 
option to help the parties resolve their disputes:  executive orders al-
lowing the government to seize companies.  During the war, there 
were no fewer than eighteen executive orders centered on labor regu-
lation.  All of the government’s industrial seizures in this period were 
accomplished by executive order.117  From 1941 to 1945, Presidents 
Roosevelt and Truman used this mechanism to conduct seventy-one 
industrial seizures.118  The number of seizures increased during each 
year of the war and peaked during fiscal year 1945.119  Of the top one 
hundred American corporations, more than one-third were seized ei-
ther in whole or in part.120  Among those seized were railroads, coal 
mines, and even the Montgomery Ward department store.121
113 Joel Seidman, Six Significant Strikes of 1941, 30 SURVEY GRAPHIC:  MAGAZINE OF 
SOCIAL INTERPRETATION 578, 578 (1941) available at http://newdeal.feri.org/survey/ 
sg41578.htm. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 SPARROW, supra note 108, at 73-74. 
118 Id. at 73. 
119 Id. at 87 tbl.3.5.  Court settlements, however, peaked in 1941.  Perhaps this in-
dicates a shift in tactics by the Roosevelt administration, as labor-management disputes 
affected defense production. 
120 Id. at 73 n.13. 
121 GEOFFREY PERRETT, DAYS OF SADNESS, YEARS OF TRIUMPH:  THE AMERICAN PEO-
PLE 1939-1945, at 303 (1973). 
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The war policies, which included wage and price controls and had 
a low tolerance for even lawful work stoppages, were an ideal ground 
for extending union membership gains.  Union membership grew 
from 8.42 million in 1940 to 13.83 million in 1945, and in 1945 union 
membership as a percentage of employment hit a peak level of thirty-
four percent—a percentage it would never reach again.  The entire 
gain in union density thus occurred in a period of thirteen years.  In 
1932, prior to the start of the NIRA, union membership was 2.9 mil-
lion and was destined to increase nearly five-fold in just thirteen years.  
Union density, which was close to ten percent prior to the onset of the 
Great Depression, would more than triple over this period.122
By the end of World War II, a major shift in political sentiment 
had occurred.  Unions were less the underdog, and strike activity both 
during and after the war changed public opinion.  As early as 1941, 
seventy-five percent of Americans favored a complete ban on strikes—
no matter the cause, and even if the strike would not affect defense.123  
Congress passed the Smith-Connally Act in response to a series of war-
time strikes by the United Mine Workers.124  The act required a thirty-
day cooling-off period between the announcement of a strike and the 
actual walkout, created a statutory basis for both the National War La-
bor Board and presidential industrial takeover powers, prohibited 
strikes in defense industries, banned union contributions to political 
parties, and made illegal strikes federal offenses.125  Congress passed 
the act over President Roosevelt’s veto.126  After several wartime 
strikes, an angry Roosevelt condemned the “selfish preoccupations of 
civilians” and in 1944 supported a National Service Act that would re-
quire Americans to either work or fight.127
Union membership was stagnant from the end of World War II 
until the beginning of the Korean War.  Once again, the need to mo-
bilize the economy for a major war pushed the Truman administra-
tion and Congress into reinstituting the corporatist economic controls 
122 See infra fig.1, at 634; Freeman, supra note 6, at 7. 
123 PERRETT, supra note 121, at 177-78.  In Gallup Poll surveys conducted in 1942 
and 1943, respondents most frequently attributed strikes to “unjust demands of work-
ers” or “labor leaders who seek personal power.”  ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF RE-
FORM:  NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN RECESSION AND WAR 215 (1995) (quotation marks 
omitted). 
124 SPARROW, supra note 108, at 71. 
125 Id.; PERRETT, supra note 121, at 307. 
126 PERRETT, supra note 121, at 307. 
127 JOHN MORTON BLUM, V WAS FOR VICTORY:  POLITICS AND AMERICAN CULTURE 
DURING WORLD WAR II, 254 (1976). 
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that had been used during the 1940s.  During the war, corporatist 
policies performed the magic they had accomplished twice before.  
Union membership increased from 13.78 million in 1950 (slightly be-
low the level reached in 1945) to 16.36 million in 1953, and union 
density, after falling from thirty-four percent to thirty percent during 
this period, climbed back to thirty-three percent.128
V.  THE LONG DECLINE IN UNION MEMBERSHIP 
The central point of this Article is that the decline in unions is 
due to one factor—the shift from a corporatist to a highly competitive 
economy.  If that is the case, and if corporatism died with the Korean 
War, then there is a puzzle.  The puzzle is not that union representa-
tion declined—rather, the puzzle is why the decline has taken so long.  
It took just twelve years for union density to climb from twelve percent 
prior to the NIRA to its peak of thirty-four percent at the end of 
World War II, but it was another forty-six years from the end of the 
Korean War until union density fell back to twelve percent in 1989.  
Today, private sector union density is roughly eight percent.129  Why 
has it taken more than half a century for unions to decline to the 
point that they are largely a niche movement in the private sector 
economy? 
The answer is that the dismantling of the corporatist economy was 
itself a long, drawn-out process, taking roughly half a century.  Al-
though the process actually began after World War II, major elements 
in the development of today’s competitive economy occurred during 
the 1980s.  As the table on union representation, infra, shows, it was 
only after the 1980s that unions lost their presence as a major institu-
tional feature of the labor market.130
Obviously, the scope of this Article cannot be to explain the dis-
mantling in any great detail.  Rather, my goal is to show that it indeed 
did take a long time to arrive at what we take for granted today:  a 
highly competitive United States economy.  For the purposes of this 
Article, I cite the major transformational political and legal events that 
brought us to our current state. 
128 See infra fig.1, at 634; Freeman, supra note 6, at 34. 
129 See infra fig.1, at 634. 
130 Id. 
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A.  Labor Law 
The end of the Korean War re-released the forces that had fueled 
the public’s negative perception of unions.  Were it not for the Ko-
rean War and the accompanying return to corporatism, the decline in 
unions would have begun after the end of World War II.  This change 
in attitude was evident in the passage of the Taft-Hartley amendments 
to the NLRA, a bill that had enough support to pass over the veto of 
President Truman. 
To most labor law scholars, Taft-Hartley represents one of the key 
causal factors leading to the decline in unions.  Taft-Hartley certainly 
represented a rebalancing of the two sides’ strike powers in favor of 
management.  In particular, the Act introduced a set of “unfair labor 
practices” by unions.131  In the original Wagner Act, unfair labor prac-
tices were restricted to the behavior of company managers.  Now, the 
NLRB could sanction the union if it engaged in certain activities such 
as secondary boycotts, which had previously proved to be highly suc-
cessful strike weapons.132
I argue that the adoption of the Taft-Hartley amendments was not 
the cause of union decline; it was a symptom, one of the first indica-
tors of the forces that were afoot.  Economic policy was moving to 
support a highly competitive economy and the original Wagner Act 
was not in step with the changes.  Taft-Hartley updated the Wagner 
Act to reflect these fundamental forces in the economy. 
Presidential-level interference in collective bargaining outcomes—
one of the hallmarks of a corporatist regime—was still an option in 
the 1960s when strikes or wage and price increases were at odds with 
public policy.  One of the most notable incidents was President Ken-
nedy’s intervention in the contract dispute between Big Steel (the ma-
jor steel producers) and the United Steelworkers Union (USW).  It 
was exactly the kind of intrusive involvement one might have expected 
131 MICHAEL C. HARPER ET AL., LABOR LAW:  CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 92-
95 (5th ed. 2003). 
132 The Taft-Hartley amendments added to the existing preamble language re-
garding misconduct by employers a paragraph recognizing the problems caused by 
union activity:  “Experience has further demonstrated that certain practices by some 
labor organizations, their officers, and members have the intent or the necessary effect 
of burdening or obstructing commerce . . . . The elimination of such practices is a 
necessary condition to the assurance of the rights herein guaranteed.”  29 U.S.C § 151 
(2000).  See also CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS:  LABOR RELA-
TIONS, LAW, AND THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1880-1960, at 275-81 
(1985) (discussing the debates leading up to the passage of Taft-Hartley). 
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of Presidents Roosevelt or Truman in labor disputes during the 1930s 
and 1940s. 
President Kennedy intervened publicly in the stalled negotiations 
between Big Steel and USW, forcing the parties to agree to a wage in-
crease that was consistent with his inflation goal.  Clearly the President 
thought he had a deal with the steel companies, but their price in-
crease following the contract settlement was greater than he ex-
pected.133  Although U.S. Steel’s Roger Blough was allowed an audi-
ence with the President to justify the company’s position, President 
Kennedy publicly called Big Steel’s actions “‘irresponsible defiance’ of 
the public interest.”134
The dispute’s denouement, which extended over three days, was 
labeled by the New York Times as a “72-Hour Drama with an All-Star 
Cast.”135  It starts with Roger Blough paying the aforementioned visit 
to the President to announce the size of the price increase.  The Presi-
dent, believing that he was double-crossed by Big Steel, lost his tem-
per.  The New York Times reports him as saying that Big Steel’s actions 
led him to believe his father’s teachings “that all business men are 
sons-of-bitches.”136  Immediately, Robert Kennedy’s Justice Depart-
ment agents descended on the headquarters of U.S. Steel and Big 
Steel members, including Bethlehem and Jones & Laughlin, and 
served subpoenas for documents bearing on the price increases and 
other matters.  Robert Kennedy convened a grand jury to look at the 
increases.  During that three-day period, four antitrust investigations 
of the steel industry were conceived and a bill to roll back prices was 
considered, as were outright price controls on steel.  Finally, the De-
fense Department began to direct purchases away from U.S. Steel. 
As the pace of events quickened, Clark Clifford was dispatched to 
tell Roger Blough that he, Clifford, hoped that a tragedy that might be-
fall the company could be averted.  Inland Steel was the first Big Steel 
member to cave, followed by Bethlehem Steel.  But the final ending, 
occurring seventy-two hours after Blough’s visit to Kennedy, was U.S. 
Steel’s announcement that it too was rolling back prices to the level 
allowed by the President.  The President was informed of the surren-
der as he came off the nuclear submarine Thomas A. Edison in Norfolk. 
133 See A.H. Raskin, Kennedy Acts on Prices, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1961, at E8. 
134 Kenneth S. Smith, Steel Price Rise Strikes Barrier, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1962, at F1. 
135 Wallace Carroll, Steel:  A 72-Hour Drama with an All-Star Cast, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
23, 1962, at 1. 
136 Id. (quotation marks omitted). 
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In keeping with the legacies of corporatism, President Kennedy 
publicly stated his position that the government had the right to look 
over the shoulders of capital and labor and to insist that any agree-
ment they reached respect the national interest.137  The President, 
however, was looking to the past rather than to the future. 
One of the other components of a corporatist economy—wage 
and price controls—did not go out of fashion as a way of directing the 
private economy until President Nixon last used it.  Wage and price 
controls were announced in a presidential address on August 15, 
1971138 and remained in effect until April 30, 1974.139  This was the last 
time that the United States adopted an economy-wide corporatist pol-
icy, perhaps because it was so remarkably unsuccessful.  The inflation 
rate at the time of the imposition of controls was slightly above four 
percent.140  It did dip slightly after the imposition of controls, but by 
the end of controls in 1974, inflation had reached double-digit rates.  
It appears that business and union leaders were no more willing to lis-
ten to President Nixon in the 1970s than they had been willing to lis-
ten to President Roosevelt in the 1930s. 
By the late 1980s, the struggle between corporatist-type govern-
ment intervention and competitive-type policies had tipped in favor of 
the latter.  Wage and price controls provide a perfect example.  When 
President Nixon introduced such controls in 1971, the inflation rate 
was 4.4%.  By the end of the Carter presidency, the inflation rate had 
reached 13.5%.141  But the times had changed.  While President 
Carter did introduce price controls over oil,142  he intervened no fur-
ther in the economy’s market system. 
While President Kennedy used corporatist strategies to deal with 
contract disputes, President Reagan did not.  President Reagan’s in-
tervention in the air traffic controller dispute in 1981 was entirely dif-
ferent in form and substance from President Kennedy’s involvement 
137 Id. 
138 Transcript of President’s Address on Moves to Deal with Economic Problems, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 16, 1971, at 14. 
139 Michael C. Jensen, Price Rises Seen as Controls End, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1974, at 
73. 
140 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, CONSUMER PRICE INDEX 
DETAILED REPORT, tbl.24 (2006), available at http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpid0608.pdf. 
141 Id. 
142 These controls were ended through an executive order by President Reagan in 
1981.  Gene Rondinaro, Deregulated Fuel Prices Straining Budgets, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 
1981, at NJ1. 
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in the steel negotiations in 1961.  While President Kennedy had inter-
vened in detail to hammer out an agreement, President Reagan did 
not intercede in the contract negotiations.  When the negotiations 
stalemated on August 3, 1981, nearly 13,000 of the 15,000 members of 
the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) 
walked off the job,143 hoping to disrupt the nation’s transportation sys-
tem and force the federal government to accede to its demands for 
higher wages, a shorter work week, and better retirement benefits.144  
That same day, President Reagan responded with a threat to fire the 
strikers if they did not return to work within forty-eight hours.145  Only 
1,000 of the strikers returned to work, and the remaining 12,000 were 
fired.146
As federal employees, the controllers were violating the no-strike 
clause of their employment contracts.  In 1955, Congress had made 
such strikes a crime punishable by a fine or one year of incarcera-
tion147—a law upheld by the Supreme Court in 1971.148  Nevertheless, 
thirty-one unauthorized federal strikes occurred between 1962 and 
1981 that resulted in no ill effects for the striking workers.149  Illegal 
strikes in state and local governments were a mainstay of the 1970s, 
generally leading to large wage gains and changes in the law allowing 
strikes; the same fate would not hold true for the air traffic control-
lers, however. 
Although the firing of the PATCO workers was allowed under 
federal law and had no direct implications for the private sector, it 
had enormous indirect effects.  Since the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Mackay Radio, unionized firms could permanently replace striking 
143 See Richard Witkin, Controllers Strike, Halting 7,000 Flights; Reagan Gives 48-Hour 
Notice of Dismissal, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1981, at A1 (noting wages, work weeks, and re-
tirement as the primary areas of dispute between the FAA and PATCO). 
144 See Key Issues in Walkout, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1981, at B8. 
145 Text of Reagan Talk on Strike, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1981, at B8. 
146 Richard Witkin, U.S. Says Goal Now Is To Reconstruct Air Control Force, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 7, 1981, at A1. 
147 Act of Aug. 9, 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-330, 69 Stat. 624 (codified as amended at 5 
U.S.C. § 7311 (2000) & 18 U.S.C. § 1918 (2000)).
148 See United Fed’n of Postal Clerks v. Blount, 404 U.S. 802 (1971) (mem.), aff’g 
325 F. Supp. 879, 882 (D.D.C. 1971) (holding that “government employees do not 
have the right to strike”). 
149 During the same period, there were seven illegal strikes that did result in dis-
missals of between 3 and 165 employees.  Eugene H. Becker, Research Summary, 
Analysis of Work Stoppages in the Federal Sector, 1962-81, 105 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 49, 50-51 
(1982). 
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workers.150  Although a potentially successful company strategy in 
cases where union workers are paid a premium over market wages, it 
was not used by major firms for fear of adverse pressure by the Presi-
dent.151  Once a President had himself used the approach, however, 
firms were willing to adopt, or threaten to adopt, the strategy.  Per-
haps the most notable example involved the dispute between heavy 
machinery manufacturer Caterpillar and the UAW.  On April 1, 1992, 
in the midst of a strike going into its fifth month, Caterpillar threat-
ened to discharge striking workers if they did not return to work 
within five days.152  Few of the strikers reported to work, and Caterpil-
lar began to successfully replace those who did not.153  Eight days later, 
the union capitulated and agreed to end the strike based on Caterpil-
lar’s agreement to stop hiring replacement workers.154
B.  Industry-Specific Regulation 
As noted earlier, while the NIRA died quickly, industry-specific 
regulations were passed during the 1930s to replace it in a number of 
critical industries.  Piece by piece, the industry-specific regulatory 
framework of the New Deal155 was rolled back, beginning in the 1970s. 
The opening salvo was announced on February 18, 1975, when 
President Ford disclosed that he would propose legislation deregulat-
ing the airline industry.156  Contending that the system was inefficient, 
150 See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938) (holding that 
“an employer . . . has . . . the right to protect and continue his business by supplying 
places left vacant by strikers”).
151 The claim that the strategy of replacing striking workers, as permitted in Mac-
kay Radio, is most useful when union wages are well above competitive levels is made in 
George M. Cohen & Michael L. Wachter, Replacing Striking Workers:  The Law and Eco-
nomics Approach, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY FORTY-THIRD ANNUAL NA-
TIONAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 109, 117-19 (Bruno Stein ed., 1990). 
152 Caterpillar Threatens To Replace Strikers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1992, at D7. 
153 Jonathan P. Hicks, Few Strikers Return To Their Jobs as Caterpillar’s Deadline Passes, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1992, at A1. 
154 Jonathan P. Hicks, Union Agrees to End Strike at Caterpillar:  Company To Stop Try-
ing To Hire Replacements, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1992, at A1. 
155 The industry-specific regulatory practices of the 1930s were similar to the in-
dustry codes of the NIRA in “stabilizing” business and allowing firms to pass on the 
higher wages required by the regulations in the form of higher prices. 
156 In the mid-1970s, under the coaching of future Supreme Court Justice Stephen 
Breyer, Senator Edward Kennedy conducted hearings regarding airline deregulation.  
During the hearings, Senator Kennedy stated:  “Regulators all too often encourage or 
approve unreasonably high prices, inadequate service, and anticompetitive behavior.  
The cost of this regulation is always passed on to the consumer.  And that cost is astro-
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costing the country more than $1 billion annually, he proposed re-
moving most federal controls over prices, entry, and exit.157  Ford’s 
proposal became law during the Carter administration in the form of 
the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978.158  The Act loosened controls 
and phased out the Civil Aeronautics Board, with all remaining airline 
oversight handed off to the Department of Transportation by 1985. 
Trucking and railroad deregulation also began in the 1970s with 
the appointment of deregulation-minded commissioners to the ICC159 
and was further instigated by the Motor Carrier Act of 1980.160  While 
the Act itself called only for liberalized entry and exit in the trucking 
industry, the ICC interpreted it as a call for wholesale deregulation 
and responded accordingly.  The ICC removed itself from any mean-
ingful regulation in its industries and was sunsetted by Congress in 
1995, over one hundred years after its birth as the United States’s first 
independent agency.161
Deregulation in the utility industry was more gradual, taking place 
over several decades and continuing through today.  It was effectuated 
through a series of legislative and administrative pronouncements.  
The watershed year in the utility industry was 1978, bringing both the 
Public Utilities Regulatory Act, which allowed independent electricity 
producers to enter the electricity generating market, and the Natural 
Gas Policy Act, which excluded new gas pipelines from existing con-
trols.  A series of orders from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion (FERC, the FPC’s successor) and finally, the passage of the Natu-
ral Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act of 1989,162 completed natural gas 
unbundling, and electricity restructuring was finalized by the Energy 
Policy Act of 1992163 and the ensuing FERC orders. 
The Justice Department was the moving force behind telecom-
munication deregulation when it called for the breakup of AT&T in 
1981.  The case was resolved with a settlement that divided AT&T into 
nomical.”  Paul Stephen Dempsey, Transportation:  A Legal History, 30 TRANSP. L.J. 235, 
331 (2003) (quotation marks omitted).  Several agencies, including the Department of 
Justice’s Antitrust Division, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Council of 
Economic Advisors, also called for deregulation.  EISNER, supra note 74, at 177. 
157 Robert Lindsey, Airline Deregulation Is Weighed, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1975, at 37. 
158 Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978), substantially repealed by Pub. L. No. 103-
272, § 7(b), 108 Stat. 1379 (1994). 
159 Dempsey, supra note 156, at 347. 
160 Id. at 343-45. 
161 Id. at 349-50. 
162 Pub. L. No. 101-60, 103 Stat. 157 (1989) (no longer in effect). 
163 Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992). 
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a number of regional Bell operating companies and the long distance 
carrier that would continue to own the manufacturing arm.164  Al-
though the strongest supporters of regulation had always been AT&T 
and the labor unions, it was believed to have strong public support as 
well.  When AT&T settled and agreed to a deregulation plan under 
Judge Harold Greene, there was no longer much public support for 
cartel-like regulatory systems.165
Comparable trends were affecting labor market regulation under 
Davis-Bacon.  Guidelines promulgated in 1985 dictated that the fed-
eral wage rate paid on construction projects would typically be the av-
erage wage and not the union wage.166  This was a critical change since 
unions were losing their control over the construction industry.  In 
the 1930s, federal projects dominated the industry and the unions 
were protected from competition by Davis-Bacon.  Today, federal pro-
jects are a small part of the industry, and the residential and commer-
cial markets have become increasingly nonunion because there are no 
regulatory barriers preventing price competition.167
C.  Corporation Law 
The last major event in the story of the decline of corporatism 
went largely unnoticed by labor law and labor relations experts be-
164 United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 226-27 (D.D.C. 1982), 
aff’d mem. sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
165 Then-president of AT&T William Ellinghaus explained his company’s willing-
ness to settle on a divestiture plan by noting that “a great deal of change has taken 
place in this country with respect to what people want in regards to telecommunica-
tions.”  The Background of the Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1982, at D6 (quotation marks 
omitted). 
166 See 29 C.F.R. § 1.2(a)(1) (2006) (defining the federal rate as the wage paid to 
“more than 50 percent” of the employees performing comparable work in the area); 
see also THIEBLOT, supra note 106, at 89-90 (discussing the history of this regulation and 
noting that it was likely to curtail the number of locales where the union wage would 
be paid). 
167 When Davis-Bacon was enacted, the federal government funded sixty percent 
of new construction projects.  Today, the federal government funds only five percent 
of new construction.  Christine Tracey, Comment, An Argument for the Repeal of the 
Davis-Bacon Act, 5 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 285, 286-88 (2001).  However, Davis-
Bacon may cover a greater portion of contracts because many state and local projects 
are partially federally funded.  In 1982, the Congressional Budget Office estimated 
Davis-Bacon coverage at twenty to twenty-five percent of all contracts. See Daniel P. 
Kessler & Lawrence F. Katz, Prevailing Wage Laws and Construction Labor Markets, 54 IN-
DUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 259, 261 (2001) (citing estimates from the Congressional Budget 
Office as support for the proposition that “the federal prevailing wage law is likely to 
affect labor markets disproportionately”). 
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cause it occurred in a courthouse in Delaware.  The issue was the 
quintessential one in the intersection of labor and corporate law:  To 
what extent should companies consider the interests of their workers 
in choosing among corporate policies?  Specifically, could the direc-
tors of a corporation reject a hostile tender offer on the grounds that 
a rejection was better for employees, customers, or other stakeholders, 
even when such actions might make shareholders worse off? 
The Delaware Supreme Court’s answer was no.  In Unocal Corp. v. 
Mesa Petroleum Co., the court stated:  “In the board’s exercise of corpo-
rate power to forestall a takeover bid our analysis begins with the basic 
principle that corporate directors have a fiduciary duty to act in the 
best interests of the corporation’s stockholders.”168  Although the di-
rectors could weigh other considerations and could use their own in-
formed position as to what constitutes the best interests of sharehold-
ers, it was for the shareholders that the corporation was to be 
managed.169
The issue was posed in its starkest terms in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAn-
drews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,170 a case where the directors had decided 
to sell the corporation for cash.  This was factually different from Uno-
cal, where the shareholders were to remain as shareholders after the 
contested transaction was implemented.  Consequently, Unocal’s 
management could claim that the long-run interests of shareholders 
would be better served by a policy that might appear to favor other 
constituencies than shareholders in the short run.  Since managers 
may at times have better information about the profitability of their 
proposed corporate policies, this is a credible claim.171
But in the Revlon transaction, the shareholders were being cashed 
out.  There would be no long run over which management’s superior 
information might prove to be correct.  Although the Revlon opinion 
is limited to the facts of the case, it contains the Delaware Supreme 
Court’s clearest statement regarding the “for whom is the corpora-
tion” debate:  “[W]hile concern for various corporate constituencies is 
proper when addressing a takeover threat, that principle is limited by 
168 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). 
169 Id. at 954 (“[T]he board’s power to act derives from its fundamental duty and 
obligation to protect the corporate enterprise, which includes stockholders . . . .”).
170 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985). 
171 See Michael L. Wachter, Takeover Defense When Financial Markets Are (Only) Rela-
tively Efficient, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 787, 793 (2003) (“[M]anagement’s superior informa-
tion may be difficult to communicate to financial markets in a manner that is verifiable 
by the market so as to be incorporated into stock prices.”). 
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the requirement that there be some rationally related benefit accru-
ing to the stockholders.”172  And furthermore, in rejecting Revlon’s 
decision to deal exclusively with its preferred bidder, even though the 
rival bid offered more cash to shareholders, the court stated:  
“[C]oncern for non-stockholder interests is inappropriate when an 
auction among active bidders is in progress, and the object no longer 
is to protect or maintain the corporate enterprise but to sell it to the 
highest bidder.”173
At the time, the importance of the Delaware court’s ruling and 
the stakes involved were well understood.  Interest groups, particularly 
labor unions, immediately began a campaign to have legislatures 
change their corporate law statutes to allow directors to weigh stake-
holder interests along with the interests of shareholders.  The most 
famous of the modifications that were enacted was Pennsylvania’s 
statute, which specifically allowed corporations to weigh the interest 
of its workers, among other groups.174
However, the political campaign to transform corporate law fiz-
zled.  Although Pennsylvania entertained some hopes that the legisla-
tion would cause companies to reincorporate in Pennsylvania instead 
of Delaware, that outcome did not happen.  Instead, under pressure, 
lawmakers allowed Pennsylvania corporations to opt out of that provi-
sion, and many of the largest companies did.175  The Delaware legisla-
ture declined to reform its corporate law by introducing a stakeholder 
protection provision. 
This battle over corporate law had major implications for organ-
ized labor.  A board of directors’ fiduciary duty is to manage the cor-
poration so as to benefit the shareholders.  Union pay premiums re-
sulting from an interest in paying a “fair” rather than a “competitive” 
wage are antithetical to the interests of the corporation unless it can 
be shown that shareholders are better off when the company agrees to 
pay such a premium.  As we shall see below, not even the most ardent 
172 Revlon, 506 A.2d at 176.  Although there is considerable gloss attached to this 
statement, the overarching goal of the directors is to manage on behalf of the corpora-
tion. 
173 Id. at 182. 
174 See 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1715(a) (West 1995) (permitting corporations to 
consider “[t]he effects of any action upon any or all groups affected by such action, 
including shareholders, employees, suppliers, customers and creditors”). 
175 See Leslie Wayne, Many Companies in Pennsylvania Reject State’s Takeover Protection, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1990, at A1 (reporting that twenty-two major Pennsylvania corpora-
tions, including H.J. Heinz, Quaker Chemical, the Sun Company, and the PNC Finan-
cial Corporation, had opted out). 
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supporters of unions make this claim.176  It is universally accepted that 
unions redistribute profits from shareholders to workers. 
The policy changes of the 1970s and 1980s took a toll on union 
membership.  In 1960, union density remained relatively high at thirty 
percent, but had dropped to twenty percent by 1980.177  That same 
year, the absolute number of union members began dropping, mov-
ing from 14.33 million in 1980 to 10.25 million in 1990.178  Between 
1960 and today, union membership decreased by half, falling from 
16.46 million to 8.26 million.179
VI.  MODERN-DAY RESOLUTIONS OF THE GREAT DEBATES 
While public policies were playing out the Second Act of the un-
ion story—replacing the 1930s-inspired corporatist policies with to-
day’s competitive policies—the great debates of the 1930s were also 
being resolved in favor of free rather than fair competition. 
A.  Labor Market—Labor Law 
As noted above, Sir John Hicks was developing a rigorous theory 
of labor markets that included the effects of labor unions and large 
corporations at the time the United States was first embarking on its 
corporatist policies.180  What Hicks and a continuing line of theorists 
in neoclassical economics have pointed out is that a competitive labor 
market generates employment and pay levels with positive normative 
features.  In particular, the competitive solution is the efficient solu-
tion in that one cannot generate higher wages without having lower 
employment.  In addition, individual workers are maximizing their 
own welfare with respect to work and leisure. 
Although the modern neoclassical theory of the labor market was 
being developed during the 1930s, it did not become accepted wis-
dom until the 1950s.  By now, it is typically accepted as an empirical 
matter that labor markets are generally competitive.181  There may be 
176 See infra notes 187-196 and accompanying text. 
177 See infra fig.1, at 634. 
178 BARRY T. HIRSCH & DAVID A. MACPHERSON, UNION MEMBERSHIP AND EARNINGS 
DATA BOOK, tbl.1b at 60-1 (2006). 
179 Freeman, supra note 6, at tbl.A1; infra fig.1, at 634. 
180 See supra text accompanying notes 29-30. 
181 See generally RONALD G. EHRENBERG & ROBERT S. SMITH, MODERN LABOR ECO-
NOMICS, 34-53 (8th ed. 2003) (discussing “how the labor market works” and the effects 
of the forces of supply and demand). 
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pockets of inefficiency where firms take advantage of uninformed 
workers, but the labor market is too broad and labor mobility too wide 
for the labor market to produce generally inefficient results.  In other 
words, the debate between the modern-day Malthusians, such as John 
Commons, and the neoclassical economists has been decided in favor 
the latter. 
Sir John was also among the first scholars to take account of the 
presence of unions as an institutional feature of the labor market.  He 
recognized that wages would not always vary sufficiently and quickly 
enough to clear the labor market.  At the same time, he theorized that 
equilibrating forces work in that direction, pulling wages toward the 
competitive level.  Consequently, while unions could raise wages above 
competitive levels, the result would be more unemployed workers.182  
Thus, competitive results generated more efficient and even more 
equitable results than did unions.183
By the end of World War II, the first academic articles were ap-
pearing that perceived the now-powerful unions to be as much or 
even more of a problem than large corporations.  Henry Simons wrote 
the first major academic article arguing that unions, along with cor-
porations, had become part of the problem of concentrated power.184  
Friedrich Hayek weighed in with The Road to Serfdom185 and Milton 
Friedman with Capitalism and Freedom,186 lending support for liberal 
pluralism.  Although these books may appear extreme to some mod-
ern readers, they were of a time when public intellectual and business 
and union leaders last debated the pros and cons of the three great 
“isms.” 
Those advocating the original 1930s corporatist position that un-
ions were still a public good that was necessary to offset the power of 
182 See HICKS, supra note 29, at 179-97 (discussing the role of unemployment in a 
competitive labor market). 
183 Even when monopoly power existed in product markets, it would not necessar-
ily translate into monopsony power in labor markets.  Indeed, Hicks may have been 
the first economist to argue that profitable corporations might even decide to pay an 
above-market wage to secure a more reliable and loyal workforce.  See id. at 85 (“[I]t is 
much more likely that a private monopolist will feel it prudent to offer his skilled em-
ployees a share in his monopoly gains than that he will ask them to contribute.”). 
184 Simons opined:  “In the name of equalizing bargaining power we have sanc-
tioned and promoted the proliferation of militant labor monopolies whose proper, 
natural function is exploitation of consumers.”  Henry C. Simons, Some Reflections on 
Syndicalism, 52 J. POL. ECON. 1, 18 (1944). 
185 F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944). 
186 MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPTALISM AND FREEDOM (1962). 
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corporations became fewer in number.  John Kenneth Galbraith was 
one commentator who continued to argue in favor of unions as a 
“countervailing power” even in a liberal pluralistic society.187  He, like 
Berle and Means, saw the large corporation as having too much power 
and unions as having too little.  Supporting union growth and power 
thus provided a counterweight to business power.  But Galbraith’s ma-
jor treatises were written in the 1950s and 1960s, and no one of his 
stature has since taken up the claim. 
By the late 1970s and early 1980s, most labor economists were 
documenting the fact that unions had raised wages above competitive 
levels, a clearly self-serving goal.  In several respects, Freeman and 
Medoff’s What Do Unions Do? 188 is the last attempt to provide support 
for the fair and union wage viewpoints.  But their claims were more 
modest than those advocated by Galbraith, Commons, and others who 
saw unions as a public good.  Freeman and Medoff claimed that un-
ions had two faces—efficiency and inefficiency promoting—and those 
two faces were largely offsetting.189
Critical to the Freeman-Medoff thesis is the claim that unions are 
primarily capturing monopoly rents or managing to increase produc-
tivity, thus offsetting the higher wage rate.  But this claim is not sup-
ported by other empirical studies190 and enjoys little support among 
187 JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM:  THE CONCEPT OF COUN-
TERVAILING POWER 121-23 (1952) (arguing that unions are particularly necessary in 
labor markets dominated by strong corporations, involving “the competition of many 
sellers dealing with few buyers”). 
188 RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS DO? (1984). 
189 See id. at 14-15 (arguing that, among other factors, unions reduce efficiency by 
striking and misallocating resources, but that they can also improve efficiency by pro-
viding a more cooperative work environment and fostering management accountabil-
ity). 
190 In an article that systematically reviewed the evidence of union effects on pro-
ductivity, Hirsch concluded:  “The empirical evidence does not allow one to infer a 
precise estimate of the average union productivity effect, but my assessment of existing 
evidence is that the average union effect is very close to zero, and as likely to be some-
what negative as somewhat positive.”  Barry T. Hirsch, What Do Unions Do for Economic 
Performance?, 25 J. LAB. RES. 415, 430 (2004).  See also, e.g., BARRY T. HIRSCH, LABOR UN-
IONS AND THE ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE OF FIRMS 91-112 (1991) (finding, through 
empirical evidence, no strong correlation between unions and productivity among U.S. 
companies); Kim B. Clark, Unionization and Firm Performance:  The Impact on Profits, 
Growth, and Productivity, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 893, 915 (1984) (finding that “unionized 
firms earn substantially lower returns than their nonunion counterparts”); Barry T. 
Hirsch & Robert A. Connolly, Do Unions Capture Monopoly Profits?, 41 INDUS. & LAB. 
REL. REV. 118, 132 (1987) (concluding that unionization may reduce long-term profit-
ability by capturing funds that would otherwise be invested in research). 
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economists today.191  In other words, unionized firms are likely to have 
higher unit labor costs and thus be less efficient than nonunion firms. 
The cost inefficiency of unions is a critical result.  In a competitive 
economy, firms with high labor costs always lose market share to firms 
with lower labor costs unless there are other offsetting economic ad-
vantages.  The decline of unions throughout the competitive private 
sectors of the economy confirms that there are no offsetting features. 
The most recent literature appears to accept this key economic re-
sult and has instead become more normative and less focused on the 
economic issues.  Speaking to the social and political benefits that un-
ionization brings to a democratic society, Cynthia Estlund’s recent 
book develops more fully and updates the original claims made by 
Clyde Summers.192  Specifically, the purpose of labor law should be to 
promote freedom of association, to protect workers’ due process, and 
to further workplace democracy.193  Although Estlund notes that 
workplaces are inherently hierarchical and nondemocratic, she argues 
that public policy has regularly intervened in the workplace to pro-
mote democratic goals. 
In her recent book, Katherine Stone argues that unions play a 
critical role in enforcing the implicit promises of employers.194  She 
claims that today’s employment agreements contain an unstated 
promise that employees will work hard (harder than they would for 
the salary alone) in exchange for the skills, training, and networking 
opportunities that the employer provides.  This training and network-
191 A recent survey that measured the views of labor economists at top universities 
asked them to estimate the “percentage impact of unions on [the] productivity of un-
ionized companies.”  The median response was zero and the mean response 3.1%.  
Victor R. Fuchs et al., Economists’ Views About Parameters, Values, and Policies:  Survey Re-
sults in Labor and Public Economics, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 1387, 1418, 1392 (1998).  See also 
Christos Doucouliagos & Patrice Laroche, What Do Unions Do to Productivity?  A Meta-
Analysis, 42 INDUS. REL. 650, 670 (2003) (concluding from empirical research that 
there is “a near zero association between unions and productivity”). 
192 CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER:  HOW WORKPLACE BONDS 
STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY 103-44 (2003) (explaining various ways that work-
place associations “enrich democratic life”); Summers, supra note 28, at 622-23 (argu-
ing that unions are important in sustaining a democratic society). 
193 See ESTLUND, supra note 192, at 169.  (“[T]he law’s . . . longstanding commit-
ment to protecting employees’ freedom of expression and association, and their efforts 
to democratize the workplace through unionization, is the firmest foothold in existing 
law for imposing civic-ness and connectedness in the workplace.”) 
194 KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS:  EMPLOYMENT REGULATION 
FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 198 (2004) (identifying unions as the “only significant 
organized group that has an interest in pressing for social legislation” such as working 
conditions). 
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ing is important to the employee because there is high job turnover in 
today’s economy, so employess need to be prepared to find new jobs 
on a relatively regular basis.  Stone believes unions can play an impor-
tant role in this system by ensuring that employers deliver on their 
promises of training and networking opportunities. 
Estlund and Stone show that much is lost in the decline of unions.  
Maybe so, but what is the policy mechanism that can provide for these 
benefits if unionized firms lose market share because of the benefit 
costs?  Both authors recommend changes to the NLRA, as others have 
done.  However, amending the NLRA in a manner that is politically 
acceptable today has been tried before,195 with no effect.  As long as 
unions raise labor costs in competitive sectors of the economy, union-
ized firms will continue to lose market share, managers in the nonun-
ion sectors will continue to strongly resist unionization, and labor law 
reforms that facilitate unionization will remain unpopular.  In a po-
litical economy that favors more competition, labor law reform is less 
likely to succeed. 
B.  Antitrust–-Business Regulation 
The antitrust debate was the first to settle in favor of competition.  
One of the stress points in the Roosevelt administration from the very 
beginning of the NIRA was its implications for antitrust policy.  The 
progressives who provided much of the early enthusiasm for the New 
Deal were very much for fair rather than free competition and the 
idea that government policy should stabilize business.  That prong of 
NIRA thinking was supported.  The idea that the result of stabilizing 
business would be codes that allowed for price fixing—virtual market 
cartelization—was anathema to the progressives. 
With the NIRA out of the way and Roosevelt’s progressive support 
base clamoring for an end to cartelization, Roosevelt appointed 
Thurman Arnold as chief of the Antitrust Division.  Arnold was a 
strong believer in a rigorous application of antitrust policy in support 
of competitive outcomes.196  Arnold’s appointment signaled the end 
195 See COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, THE 
DUNLOP COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS:  FINAL 
REPORT (1994), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/key_workplace/2/. 
196 Arnold vigorously enforced the antitrust statutes, filing half the number of suits 
in his five years in office as all of his predecessors combined.  Arnold used “industry-
wide” prosecutions which sought to eliminate anticompetitive practices that were not 
necessarily confined to an individual firm or group.  The standard by which he judged 
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of the cartelization experiment and also the end of any serious intel-
lectual debate that antitrust should be used to restrict competition 
rather than to promote it. 
Appalachian Coals remains the Supreme Court’s single decision 
that applied the rule of reason to protect a price-fixing agreement 
among sellers.  Although the case precedes the passage of the NIRA, 
the fact pattern could easily have been applied to a price-fixing code 
of the NIRA.  The case has had little force or effect in the antitrust 
landscape.197  It remains “a relic of the New Deal’s distrust of competi-
tion and [the traditional application of] the antitrust laws.”198
Today, it is generally recognized that modern neoclassical eco-
nomics forms the basis of federal antitrust law.199  The primary statu-
tory exception is the Robinson-Patman Act, which remains on the 
books due to the support “of small and medium-sized businesses [that 
want protection from] larger, [more efficient] competitors.”200  How-
ever, Robinson-Patman’s hostility to competition makes it nearly in-
comprehensible in the context of the modern antitrust laws.201  Per-
haps as a consequence, the “Department of Justice has not enforced 
the Act since 1977, and the Federal Trade Commission has greatly re-
duced its enforcement as well.”202
Today, no major antitrust scholar advocates that antitrust laws be 
overhauled so that competing firms could restrict product market 
competition so as to generate monopoly profits.  But without the mo-
monopoly was simply consumer prices, believing any organization that had the power 
to inflate prices was a problem.  ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF REFORM:  NEW DEAL LIB-
ERALISM IN RECESSION AND WAR, 116-17 (1995). 
197 See Spencer Weber Waller, The Antitrust Philosophy of Justice Holmes, 18 S. ILL. U. 
L J. 283, 294 (1994) (“While . . . one can twist Appalachian Coals into an approximation 
of modern per se/rule of reason analysis, it is clearly an aberration of the Depression 
era. . . . [I]t has never been followed or even cited approvingly in any subsequent anti-
trust case in the Supreme Court.”). 
198 HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, at 200.  The case does retain interest for its ap-
proach to measure market power.  Id.  It is likely that the narrow scope of the group 
setting the price of coal would not have succeeded. 
199 See id. at 2 (noting that “antitrust policy makers are quite stodgy about adopting 
new theory” and that it is “relatively orthodox economics that forms the basis of federal 
antitrust policy”). 
200 SULLIVAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 34, at 931. 
201 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, at 572-73 (“[Robinson-Patman’s] inconsisten-
cies with the other antitrust laws are so substantial that businesses have often com-
plained that they can comply with the Robinson-Patman Act only by violating the other 
antitrust laws, or vice-versa. . . . The [whole] theory of injury embodied in the Robin-
son-Patman Act is an intellectually hostile, impenetrable swamp.”). 
202 Id. at 572. 
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nopoly profits, unions cannot succeed in their primary goal of taking 
wages out of competition.  Although the NIRA is itself a relic, the 
drafters of the NIRA were willing to recognize the important tie be-
tween labor law and antitrust law. 
As noted above,203 the regulation of individual industries was the 
New Deal’s replacement for the NIRA.  Industry-based regulation re-
mained popular among commentators until the early 1970s, when 
George Stigler’s influential article204 began to change the debate.  He 
criticized as idealistic and unrealistic the view that public regulation 
would benefit the public interest.  Instead, he claimed that the main 
beneficiaries of regulation were the regulated companies, who were 
protected by barriers to entry, direct subsidies, and price controls.205  
This, he wrote, should not come as a surprise, since an industry’s 
regulation is created in the political process where politicians curry 
favor with interest groups, including the regulated companies.206
Stigler’s theory that the regulators “capture” the regulatory proc-
ess is meant to be highly critical.  This indicates how far the corpora-
tist ideal had faded in people’s memory.  In the corporatist economy, 
the peak associations were supposed to have a seat at the policy table.  
The peak associations—that is, the regulated parties—were supposed 
to help set the prices and wages of fair competition.207
At the same time, Alfred Kahn weighed in with the first of his two-
volume work on the economics of regulation.  Kahn, like Stigler, ar-
gued that regulation should be viewed through an economics lens and 
that the costs of regulation might indeed outweigh the benefits.208
These articles turned the tide in the debate about industry regula-
tion.  An interesting feature of the debate is the change in the chords 
203 See supra Part IV.B. 
204 George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. 
SCI. 3 (1971). 
205 Id. at 3. 
206 Id. at 17-18. 
207 See supra text accompanying note 19. 
208 See 2 ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION:  PRINCIPLES AND IN-
STITUTIONS 326 (1970). (“The possibility is by no means excluded that on balance 
regulation does more harm than good . . . .”).  Economist Arnold Harberger suggested 
that the economic benefits of regulation are small.  While noting that the loss in wel-
fare due to monopoly is difficult to calculate, he estimated that the loss is relatively low.  
See Arnold C. Harberger, The Measurement of Waste, 54 AM. ECON. REV. 58, 59-60 (1964); 
Arnold C. Harberger, Monopoly and Resource Allication, 44 AM. ECON. REV. 77, 85 (1954) 
(estimating the welfare loss attributable to monopoly inefficiencies at one-thirtieth of 
one percent of the economy). 
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being sounded.  The only benefits and costs that count are those of 
the consumer, while the special interests of small businesses are given 
no weight.  No special attention is paid to the goals of labor unions 
and fair wages.  The only goal is achieving the competitive price in a 
competitive economy. 
C.  Corporation Law 
The great debate between Berle and Dodd ended when key com-
ponents of their respective positions were rendered equally unsup-
portable by actual economic and political developments.  The Berle 
and Means position rested heavily on the assumption that economic 
power would continue to consolidate in a few extremely powerful cor-
porations.209  That did not happen.  As the economy expanded, mar-
kets grew in size, product differentiation took hold, and new indus-
tries developed, it became clear that competitive forces were at work 
that provided a natural restraint on the size of the firm. 
Berle and Dodd also believed that the separation of ownership 
from control would create agency cost problems that would be nearly 
impossible to constrain, with the result that firms would be managed 
to maximize managerial wealth rather than stockholder wealth.210  
That did not happen either.  While the principal/agent problem con-
tinues to be a major topic of research today, the debate has moved far 
away from the raw, unconstrained agency problem discussed by Berle 
and Means. 
The modern debate recognizes that the corporate issue is similar 
to the general problem of delegation of authority from principals to 
agents.  Principals have an incentive to monitor their agents, and 
agents have an incentive to bond their behavior.  The corporate law 
principal/agent issue is different to the extent that directors are trus-
tees as much as they are agents. 
The monitoring and bonding behavior envisioned by the theory is 
supported by elaborate state corporation law and federal securities 
law.  Delaware has amended its statutory duty of loyalty a number of 
times and case law has developed a detailed and nuanced mechanism 
for controlling self-interested transactions by directors and manag-
209 BERLE & MEANS, supra note 40, at 357. 
210 See Dodd, supra note 47, at 1147 (indicating that the basis of the Dodd position 
was that dispersed shareholders, by delegating authority to managers, had given up 
their claim to have the corporation managed exclusively for their benefit). 
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ers.211  Federal securities laws, first passed during the Great Depres-
sion, provide for a massive disclosure requirement that enables in-
formed stock market analysts and investors to track the self-interested 
behavior by directors and managers.212
If the law is adequate in restraining the agency costs raised by the 
separation of ownership of control, then the Berle and Means thresh-
old assumption is incorrect.  Agency costs are not that large and, con-
sequently, the corporation can be managed on behalf of the share-
holders. 
This leaves the normative question as to whether the corporation 
should be managed to take account of other constituencies.  On this 
point, the academic answer is almost universally in favor of managing 
on behalf of shareholders.  Indeed, much of the academic literature213 
reaches the same conclusion as did the Delaware Supreme Court in 
Revlon:  although other constituencies can be considered when direc-
tors discharge their responsibilities, those constituent interests can 
only be considered when they are “rationally related benefit[s] accru-
ing to the stockholders.”214
CONCLUSION 
The rapid rise of unions takes place in a brief, thirteen-year pe-
riod:  1932 to 1945.  There is then a decade-long intermission, where 
union density hardly changes:  1945 to 1954.  This is then followed by 
a slow decline over fifty years.  Union representation in the private 
sector of the economy is now back to where it was prior to the Great 
Depression. 
Both the rise and the decline are remarkable events.  Neither was 
caused by a lucky or unlucky confluence of factors that by happen-
stance came together to cause the two events.  Both were caused by a 
single fundamental factor: the adoption and then abandonment of 
key elements of corporatism.  During the periods when corporatism 
was in effect, under either the NIRA or subsequent, industry-specific 
211 See Edward Rock & Michael Wachter, Dangerous Liaisons:  Corporate Law, Trust 
Law, and Interdoctrinal Legal Transplants, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 651, 668-69 (2002) (examin-
ing the development of Delaware’s current rule of “entire fairness” to the firm). 
212 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (2000); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
15 U.S.C. § 78 (2000). 
213 See Wachter, supra note 171, at 805 n.56. 
214 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 173 (Del. 
1985). 
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regulation, unions grew in strength.  Unions declined slowly and 
steadily as the United States moved from a corporatist economy at the 
end of the Korean War to the highly competitive economy that exists 
today. 
In a corporatist economy, labor unions, and in particular the fed-
eration of unions, are central players.  The union federation, as a peak 
association, counts separately from its members and has a seat at the 
highest level of policymaking.  The union federation’s primary goal—
achieving a fair wage rather than a competitive wage—fits the corpo-
ratist goal of stabilizing business.  Unions serve as a public good, the 
critical countervailing force to corporate power. 
The United States’s experiment with corporatism offered a coher-
ent theory.  Labor, antitrust, and corporate laws were all to pull in the 
same direction.  Fair wages were to be paid and those wages were to be 
above competitive wages.  Fair wages were to be paid out of fair prices, 
and the fair prices were to be above the prices that would exist in a 
competitive product market.  Directors of corporations would be 
asked to consider the interests of stakeholders such as workers, in ad-
dition to shareholders. 
That coherent story, where unions had a clear and consistent pub-
lic-supporting role, was not replaced when today’s highly competitive 
economy crystallized.  Unions no longer count directly in the public 
welfare calculus; only individuals count.  Unions still bargain for a fair 
wage, but antitrust or industrial regulation no longer provides for 
above-competitive prices to pay those above-market wages.  In corpo-
rate law, the directors are asked to manage the corporation so as to 
maximize the value of the shareholders’ interest.  High wages that re-
duce corporate profits are arguably inconsistent with the fiduciary du-
ties of faithful corporate directors. 
The unraveling of the coherent corporatist theory leaves unions 
alone.  Unions are a corporatist institution; they do not prosper when 
the forces of the competitive economy are unleashed. 
If my argument is correct, then we also need to reexamine our 
understanding of the expectations that the founders of the original 
NLRA (the Wagner Act) might have reasonably entertained.  The 
Wagner Act followed on the heels of the demise of the NIRA.  Unlike 
the NIRA, the Wagner Act was a labor-only policy since there was no 
ancillary, supporting legislation in other areas of industrial policy. 
My analysis attempts to be neither normative nor to recommend 
policies, although my modern sympathies for a competitive system 
probably show through.  However, there are a few implications that 
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are worth mentioning.  If my analysis is correct, then no change in la-
bor law or labor market policies, absent changes in overall industrial 
policy, will allow unions to become the mass movement they were in 
1945.  Tinkering with the NLRA is unlikely to substitute for an NIRA-
type structure. 
On the other hand, unions may be able to continue prospering as 
a niche movement in the government sector, which is the sole remain-
ing noncompetitive sector, and in sectors where individual firms or 
industries take advantage of either uninformed or immobile workers 
to enforce below-competitive pay packages.  As Neil Chamberlain, an-
other one of the great figures in industrial relations, wrote in 1960:  
“unions’ chief contribution to their members’ welfare has been to free 
them from the tyranny of arbitrary decision or discriminatory action 
in the work place.”215  In those cases where individual firms exercise 
exploitative power to set wages below competitive levels, the same 
beneficial results emerge—unions can and should improve the func-
tioning of labor markets. 
 
215 Neil Chamberlain, The Corporation and the Trade Union, in THE CORPORATION IN 
MODERN SOCIETY 122, 140 (Edward S. Mason ed., 1960). 
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Sources:  Data for Total:  Richard B. Freeman, Spurts in Union Growth:  Defining Moments and 
Social Processes, app. A1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6012, 1997).  
Data for Private Sector:  BARRY HIRSCH & DAVID MACPHERSON, UNION MEMBERSHIP AND 
EARNINGS DATA BOOK,  14 tbl.1d (2006).
